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Death Penalty Jurisprudence in New York
1995 to the Present: How Far Have We
Come? Where Are We Headed?
The Honorable Joseph E. Fahey*
In 1995, following a twenty-one year hiatus, the New York
State Legislature enacted death penalty legislation that was
signed by Governor George Pataki. The subject of this paper
will be an examination of the death penalty legislation enacted
by the Legislature and the Governor as well as the cases decided by the trial courts and appellate courts of this State which
have had to implement it.
Historical Background
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia1 determined that the system of capital punishment,
then in existence, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend* The author is a Judge of the New York State Unified Court System, who
presides in Onondaga County Court, as well as an Adjunct Professor of Law at
Syracuse University College of Law; J.D. Syracuse University College of Law and
LLM in Criminal Law from the University at Buffalo Law School.
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
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ments of the Constitution of the United States. The Justices, in
a series of plurality opinions, agreed that a system which allowed juries to impose it with unbridled discretion rendered the
punishment both arbitrary and capricious. 2 The New York
Court of Appeals, following the United States Supreme Court
mandate in Furman, ruled that the existing law set forth in former sections 125.25 and 125.30 of the Penal Law 3 was unconstitutional. 4 In 1974, the Legislature attempted to rectify this by
5
re-enacting legislation making capital punishment mandatory,
but this too was determined to be unconstitutional as the Su6
preme Court revisited the issue in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia,
Woodson v. North Carolina,7 and Roberts v. Louisiana.8 In
Gregg, the Court held that capital punishment for the crime of
murder is not per se unconstitutional provided that the sentencing procedures are carefully drafted so that the sentencing authority is afforded sufficient information concerning
aggravating and mitigating factors in order that the penalty not
be imposed disproportionately rendering it arbitrary and capricious. 9 Concomitantly in Woodson and Roberts, the Court held
that those statutes that provided for the mandatory infliction of
death as a punishment likewise violated the Eight and Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. 10 The following year, the New York Court of Appeals,
in People v. Davis, once again applied the Supreme Court's
holdings in Gregg," Woodson,12 and Roberts,'3 deciding
mandatory infliction of the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.' 4 Interestingly, the court left open the issue of whether
2. Id. at 240-75.
3. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1967) (amended 1974); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.30 (McKinney 1967) (repealed 1974).
4. People v. Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d 139 (N.Y. 1973).
5. Laws of 1974, 1974 N.Y. Laws 367 (codified at former N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 60.06, 125.27 (McKinney 1974)).
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-99 (1976).
7. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
8. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
9. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
10. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 306; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336.
11. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
12. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280.
13. Roberts, 428 U.S. 325.
14. People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1977).
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this prohibition extended to the crime of murder committed by
an inmate serving a life sentence charged in section
125.27(1)(a)(iii); however, this last vestige of section 125.27 was
finally nullified by the New York Court of Appeals in 1984 in
16
People v. Smith. 15 In 1995, the present law was enacted.
The Statute
Section 125.27 of the Penal Law, defining murder in the
first degree, requires that the killing be intentional and sets
twelve aggravating factors for which the sentence of death may
be imposed. Like its 1974 predecessor section, which elevated
the killing of a police officer, a corrections officer, as well as a
murder committed by one serving a life sentence to the crime of
murder in the first degree, 17 the 1995 enactment also expanded
the class of victims encompassed by the crime of murder in the
first degree to include certain peace officers,' 8 a witness to a
crime or a member of the witness's immediate family who is
killed to prevent the witness from testifying, 19 and judges. 20 It
also expanded the kind of conduct covered by the statute to include "contract killings," 21 felony murder, which now includes
the felonies of murder in the second degree and attempted murder in the second degree, 22 causing the death of two or more
persons in the same criminal transaction, 23 "torture killings," 24
"serial killings," 25 or killing in furtherance of an act of terror15. People v. Smith, 468 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1984).
16. Laws of 1995, 1995 N.Y. Laws c. 1 § 7 (codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2003)).
17. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(i)-(iii) (1974), with N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(i), (iii), (iv) (1995).
18. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(ii).
19. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(v).
20. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(xii).
21. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(vi).
22. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) (this section also imposes accessorial liability for the
conduct of another under this provision but it is limited only to one who "commands" another to commit the killing).
23. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(viii).
24. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(x).
25. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(xi) (this section contains a specific definition of the conduct proscribed, i.e. killing two or more individuals in separate criminal transactions within the state within a twenty-four month period in a similar fashion or
pursuant to a common scheme or plan).
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ism. 26 Finally, similar to subdivision (iv) of this section, a provision was included to elevate murder to that of murder in the
first degree where the defendant has been previously convicted
of murder in this state or in another jurisdiction, and that prior
offense would constitute a violation of section 125.27 or section
27
125.25 of the Penal Law.
In re-enacting capital punishment, the State built a number of safeguards into the statute to avoid various constitutional
challenges to it. It provided that the defendant in any prosecution must be eighteen years old. 28 In so doing, the Legislature
and the Governor not only increased the age of criminal culpability under this statute by two years, but avoided those issues
that were raised in Thompson v. Oklahoma,29 and Stanford v.
Kentucky, 30 in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" made
it impermissible to execute fifteen year-olds but permissible to
execute those who were sixteen years old and older. Like its
predecessor legislation,3 ' this section also provides for the affirmative defenses of "extreme emotional disturbance" and "as32
sisting a suicide."
Trial and Sentencing Procedures
The pre-trial, trial and sentencing procedures governing a
capital prosecution are sprinkled throughout the Criminal Procedure Law. Section 250.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law requires the prosecution to serve and file a notice of intent to seek
the death penalty within 120 days of the filing of an indictment
charging murder in the first degree. The court may, for "good
cause shown" extend the time for service and filing of the no26. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(xiii) (this section, as well as that defining "an act of terrorism" contained in Article 490 of the Penal Law, was created and added by the
Legislature on September 17, 2001, six days after the attack on the World Trade
Center in New York City).
27. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(ix).
28. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(b) (this provision was included in N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.27 (1974) but was not contained in its predecessor N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.25 (1973)).
29. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
30. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
31. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (1973); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (1974).
32. Id. § 125.27(2)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2003).
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tice.33 In the event such a notice is served and filed, the defendant is entitled to an additional sixty days to file new or
supplemental motions. 34 The prosecution is only entitled to file
35
one notice and if it is withdrawn, it may not be re-filed.
Section 220.30(3)(vii) of the Criminal Procedure Law restricted the right of a defendant to enter a plea of guilty to the
crime of murder in the first degree unless the sentence to be
imposed is a non-capital one and both the court and the prosecution have consented to the entry of such a plea.3 6 Prior to the
restoration of capital punishment in 1995, this section barred
entry of a guilty plea to the crime of murder in the first degree
under any circumstances since the imposition of death under
the previous scheme was mandatory. 37 This particular statute
has been the subject of considerable litigation, which will be discussed later.
Because the statutory framework involves imposition of the
death penalty, it contains several restrictions concerning the
ability of a defendant to enter a guilty plea 38 and a prohibition
against waiving a jury trial. 39 Both would become the subject of
numerous challenges in the various courts of the State.
In addition to the other provisions contained in Article 270
of the Criminal Procedure Law, which govern the formation and
conduct of a jury trial, there are two that particularly concern
death penalty cases. Section 270.16 provides for the individual
questioning of jurors to determine if they have any racial bias
and section 270.20(1)(f) provides that a juror may be challenged
for cause where:
the crime charged may be punishable by death and the prospective juror entertains such conscientious opinions either against or
in favor of such punishment as to preclude such juror from rendering an impartial verdict or from properly exercising the discre33. N.Y. CRIM.

PRoc. LAW

§ 250.40(2) (McKinney 2003).

34. Id. § 250.40(3) (McKinney 2003).
35. Id. § 250.40(4) (McKinney 2003).

36. Id. § 220.30(3)(vii) (McKinney 2003).
37. Id. § 220.30(3)(vii) (McKinney 1973).
38. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW

§§

220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(a)(vii) (McKinney 2003).

39. Id. § 320.10 (McKinney 2003) (this is the statutory prohibition based upon
art. 1, § 2, of the N.Y. CONST.). See N.Y. CONST. art. I § 2.
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tion conferred upon such juror by law in the determination of a
sentence pursuant to Section 400.27.40
Section 400.27 of the Criminal Procedure Law sets forth the
procedures to be followed for determining the sentence to be imposed upon a guilty verdict for the crime of murder in the first
degree where a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has
been duly served and filed pursuant section 240.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law. This section provides for a separate sentencing procedure to determine whether the defendant shall be
sentenced to death or life without parole. 4 1 It further allows the
prosecution to abandon its right to seek the death penalty, abort
the proceeding and allow the court to impose a sentence of life
without parole or such other authorized indeterminate sentence
pursuant to sections 70.00(2)(a)(i) and 70.00(3)(a)(i) of the Penal
Law. 42 The section further allows the court to empanel a new
jury for the sentencing proceeding but only "in extraordinary
circumstances and upon a showing of good cause, which may
include, but is not limited to, a finding of prejudice to either
party." 43 Notwithstanding the special provisions contained in
Article 270 of the Criminal Procedure Law concerning the selection of jurors previously discussed, this section provides the additional safeguard that the sentencing phase begin with a
second voir dire conducted solely by the court, although the parties may submit proposed questions. 44 As both the statute and
the Practice Commentary accompanying it suggest, the purpose
of such a pre-penalty phase voir dire is to determine whether
any juror has developed a prejudice or view from the evidence
presented that would prevent the juror from rendering a fair
and impartial sentencing determination. 45 If the court determines that any juror has developed such a bias, it must discharge the juror and replace the juror with the first alternate
juror. If no alternate juror exists, it must discharge the jury
and impanel a new jury. 46 Interestingly, if the court is required
40. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(f) (McKinney 2003).
41. Id. § 400.27(1).

42. Id.
43. Id. § 400.27(2).
44. Id.
45. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(2) (McKinney 2003); Peter Preiser, Practice Commentary, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30 (McKinney Supp. 2003).
46. § 400.27(2); Preiser, Practice Commentary to § 400.27(2).
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to select a new jury in either of the situations described in this
section, it must do so in the same manner, utilizing the same
procedures and safeguards previously discussed, contained in
Article 270 of the Criminal Procedure Law.47
In order to avoid undue prejudice to the defendant during
the sentencing proceeding, this section further provides that
any of the aggravating factors proven during the trial are
deemed to be established beyond a reasonable doubt and testimonial or physical evidence establishing them may not be
presented again. 48 The only exception to this prophylactic rule
is a provision that allows the prosecution to introduce evidence
that during the previous ten years the defendant has been convicted in this state or another jurisdiction on two different occasions of another homicidal offense, a B level violent felony
offense, or an offense involving the use of a deadly weapon or
the infliction, attempted infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury as another aggravating factor. 49 The statute requires the prosecution to serve and file notice of its intent
to offer such evidence prior to trial.50 It further requires that
such an aggravating factor must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and provides that the defendant may offer evidence in defense of it and each party may offer evidence in
rebuttal. 51
The section sets forth five specific mitigating factors that
the defendant may introduce evidence for the jury to consider.
These include, no significant history of violent criminal convictions, 52 evidence of mental retardation or mental impairment
that does not rise to the level of a legal defense to the charges, 53
evidence of duress or domination that does not rise to the level
of a defense to the charges,5 4 evidence that participation in the
offense was minor but not so minor that it constitutes a defense
47. Id.
48. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(3).

49. Id. § 400.27(7)(a).
50. Id. § 400.27(7)(c).

51. Id. § 400.27(7)(b).
52. Id. § 400.27(9)(a).
53. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(9)(b) (the issue of mental retardation is
further dealt with in two distinct ways elsewhere in the section and will be discussed further).
54. Id. § 400.27(9)(c).
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to the charge, 55 and evidence that the defendant was impaired
by the use of alcohol or drugs but not to the degree that the
impairment constitutes a defense. 56 Finally, it provides a general catch-all factor encompassing any circumstance concerning
the crime, or anything in the defendant's background or condi57
tion or state of mind that might mitigate the punishment.
Subdivision 10 of this section sets forth the reversed order
of summations, allowing the defendant to have the last word
with the jury.58 Subdivision 11 mandates the procedure that
the sentencing jury must follow in arriving at a verdict. It appears to track its predecessor legislation somewhat by requiring
the jury to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. 59 In
this regard, the jury must weigh those aggravating factors that
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to determine if
they substantially outweigh those mitigating factors that have
been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. If the jury so
agrees unanimously, it must then determine unanimously that
a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole may be
imposed. 60 In reporting such a verdict it must specify, on the
record, those aggravating and mitigating factors it considered
and those mitigating factors proven by the defendant. 61 If the
jury fails to unanimously agree upon a sentence, the court must
sentence the defendant to an indeterminate life sentence having a minimum of twenty to twenty-five years imprisonment,
62
and the jury must be instructed about this possibility.
As noted previously, New York built into its statute certain
safeguards concerning defendants who may be mentally retarded that prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. Subdivision 12 of the statute provides that prior to the
commencement of the sentencing proceeding, the court, at the
request of the defendant, shall conduct a hearing outside the
55. Id. § 400.27(9)(d).
56. Id. § 400.27(9)(e).
57. Id. § 400.27(9)(e).
58.
59.
60.
61.

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(10).
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.35 (1973).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(10).
Id. § 400.27(10).

62. Id. § 400.27(10), 11(c). Unlike the 1973 legislation, which allowed the
court to empanel a second jury to decide the sentence if the first failed to agree, a

jury under the present sentencing scheme is empanelled only once to decide a capital sentence. Id.
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presence of the jury to determine whether the defendant is
mentally retarded. 63 The burden of proof on this issue is borne
by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. The
court, at the conclusion of the hearing, reserves decision until
the sentencing proceeding is concluded. If the jury reaches a
non-capital verdict, no determination is made. In the event the
jury decides to impose a capital sentence and the court concludes the defendant is mentally retarded, it must set aside the
verdict of death and impose a non-capital sentence. However,
should the court determine that the defendant is not mentally
retarded, it may not disturb the sentence of death. 64 This provision does not apply where the defendant is convicted of murder
in the first degree pursuant to section 125.27(1)(a) (iii) of the
Penal Law, but the defendant may still introduce evidence of
mental retardation as a mitigating factor during the sentencing
65
proceeding.
This particular statute also provides for the same type of
proceeding upon written application prior to trial.66 If the court
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is
mentally retarded, it shall enter an order reciting that finding
and the prosecution may appeal from it.67 If the order is not
reversed on appeal and the defendant is convicted of murder in
the first degree, then no sentencing proceeding is conducted and
the court shall impose a non-capital sentence. If the court finds
that the defendant is not retarded, it has preclusive effect, vitiating a second hearing during the sentencing proceeding. The
defendant, however, may still present evidence of mental retardation to the sentencing jury in mitigation of the sentence. 68 In
addition to setting forth these procedures, the statute also defines the terms "mental retardation" and "psychiatric evidence,"
and sets forth a procedure for examination of the defendant and

63. Id. § 400.27(12)(a). However, with the consent of both parties, the hearing
or a portion of it, may be conducted before the jury, contemporaneously with the
sentencing proceeding.
64. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(12)(b)-(c).
65. Id. § 400.27(12)(d).
66. Id. § 400.27(12)(e).
67. Id. § 400.27(12)(e)-(f).
68. Id. § 400.27(12)(e)-(f).
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reciprocal discovery obligations by each party, as well as sanctions for failing to comply with these requirements. 69
In adopting these proscriptions and procedures, New York,
at first blush, appears to have been quite prescient. Only six
years prior to this enactment, the United States Supreme Court
in Penry v. Lynaugh70 decided that executing the mentally retarded did not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court, however,
revisited this issue on June 20, 2002, in Virginia v. Atkins, 71
and reversed Penry72 holding that it did violate this proscription. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, analyzed the issue utilizing the "evolving standards of decency" principle
announced by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles.7 3 In conducting his analysis, Justice Stevens recounted the number of
states that had outlawed the execution of the mentally retarded, including New York.7 4 Of particular interest in the Atkins decision is that Justice Stevens took note of the fact that
execution of the mentally retarded is not prohibited in New
York where the conviction is for murder in the first degree pursuant to section 125.27(a)(iii) of the Penal Law. 75 Whether the
provision allowing this set forth in Criminal Procedure Law section 400.27(12)(d) will survive a challenge under Atkins, in either the New York Court of Appeals or the United States
Supreme Court remains to be seen.
As part of the re-enactment of the death penalty in 1995,
the Criminal Procedure Law provisions governing the appeals
in death penalty cases were substantially revised. Sections
450.70 and 470.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law have always
governed the right to a direct appeal to the New York Court of
Appeals of a death sentence in New York. A comparison of the
current section of 450.70 of the Criminal Procedure Law and its
predecessor, enacted in 1970,76 reveal that they have identical
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(e), (13), (14).
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Virginia v. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 302.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.

75. Id. at 315 n.13.
76. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 450.70 (1970), amended by Laws of 1995, 1995
N.Y. Laws c. 1 § 23.
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provisions concerning those matters which are appealable directly to the New York Court of Appeals with the addition of an
appeal from an order of the trial court setting aside a sentence
of death as provided in section 400.27(11)(d) of the Criminal
Procedure Law. 77 The addition of this particular provision was
deemed necessary because the predecessor section of 470.30 of
the Criminal Procedure Law, which set forth what remedial action the New York Court of Appeals could take, expressly provided that, "except that the New York Court of Appeals may not
as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice set aside, reduce or change the sentence of death as being unduly harsh or
78
severe."
Since the new statutory scheme passed in 1995 was expressly designed to comport with the Supreme Court's holding
in Gregg v. Georgia,79 New York built additional safeguards into
the New York Court of Appeals when it modified section 470.30
in 1995. The new statute left intact subdivision one of the predecessor statute which incorporates the corrective action embodied in sections 470.15 and 470.20 concerning determinations by
the intermediate appellate courts of appeal.80 The new law requires that when a sentence of death is imposed, the judgment
and the sentence must be reviewed by the New York Court of
Appeals on the record. This review cannot be waived. 8 ' Subdivision three of the new section sets forth three criteria by which
each sentence must be scrutinized. These include whether the
sentence was the product of prejudice or passion or other impermissible factor including the race of the victim or the defendant,8 2 and whether the sentence is excessive or
disproportionate to similar crimes and, at the request of the defendant, whether the race of either the victim or the defendant
may have been a factor.8 3 In his PracticeCommentary accompanying this section, Professor Preiser comments:
Although proportionality review is not required by the federal
constitution, Supreme Court precedent appears to indicate that,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30(1) (McKinney 2003).
Id. § 470.30(2).
Id. § 470.30(3)(a).
Id. § 470.30(3)(b).

11
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where the death penalty is at issue, there must be appellate review focusing upon the individual circumstances of each case in
passing upon the sentence. Accordingly, the revisions eliminate
the former restrictions upon altering the sentence in the interest
of justice on the ground that it is unduly harsh or severe. Moreover, as can be seen by perusing the new provisions, they afford the
defendant vastly broader grounds for attack upon the sentence
than required by federal constitutional law.84
In fact, it appears that the Legislature and the Governor
8 5 In crafting these
did more than simply follow Pulley v. Harris.
particular features into the statute requiring the New York
Court of Appeals to measure proportionality in the context of
the race of the victim and the defendant, New York has provided for the type of review rejected by the United States Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp. 86 In order to effectuate this
process, the State enacted section 211-a of the Judiciary Law
which requires that the New York Court of Appeals adopt a procedure to insure that the clerk of the trial court compile data
about the crime and the defendant so that the New York Court
of Appeals will have a data base that enables it to conduct the
proportionality review.
The Case Law
At this writing, seven cases construing the statutory
scheme and a single death sentence appeal have been reviewed
by the New York Court of Appeals. Those cases are Hynes v.
Tomei,8 7 People v. Mateo,88 People v. Couser,8 9 Matter of Francois v. Dolan,90 People v. Edwards,91 People v. Mower,92 and Peo93
ple v. Harris.
84.
Kinney
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Peter Preiser, Practice Commentary, N.Y. CRIM.
Supp. 2003) (citations omitted).
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 53 (1984).
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1986).
Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
People v. Mateo, 712 N.E.2d 692 (N.Y. 1999).
People v. Couser, 730 N.E.2d 953 (N.Y. 2000).
Francois v. Dolan, 731 N.E.2d 614 (N.Y. 2000).
People v. Edwards, 754 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 2001).
People v. Mower, 765 N.E.2d 839 (N.Y. 2002).
People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2002).
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Matter of Hynes v. Tomei
The first case that resulted in the New York Court of Appeals review, Hynes v. Tomei, 94 originated in Supreme Court,
Kings County and grew out of the case of People v. Hale.9 5 In
Hale, the defendant, who was charged with murder in the first
degree, challenged the constitutionality of sections 220.10(5)(e),
220.30(b)(vii) and 220.60(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Law,
which only allowed him to avoid the death penalty by entering a
plea of guilty, with the consent of the court and the prosecutor,
thereby denying him his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by
jury and his Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination.
Judge Tomei agreed with this proposition relying on United
States v. Jackson.9 6 In Jackson the Supreme Court struck down
97
the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act,
which authorized the imposition of the death penalty only after
a jury trial. As Justice Tomei summarized the United States
Supreme Court's decision, "[a]ccording to the court, the statute
needlessly encouraged guilty pleas and effectively penalized the
right to a jury trial by exposing the defendant to the risk of
death only when he exercised his constitutional rights."9 8 The
court went on to observe:
It is apparent that New York's death penalty statute, likewise, provides for the imposition of the death penalty only upon
recommendation of the jury; the provisions governing pleas in
capital cases in New York expressly forbid the imposition of the
death penalty upon a plea of guilty, and a defendant may not
waive a jury trial where the crime charged may be punishable by
death. Only if the defendant insists upon exercising his sixth
amendment right to a jury trial and his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does he risk death. Therefore, unless
New York's law may be distinguished from the act in question in
is bound to find the plea provisions to be
Jackson, this court
99
unconstitutional.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1967).
Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
Id. at 479-80 (citations omitted).

13

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1

Justice Tomei then compared the two statutes, noting that
the defendant under the federal law could avoid the death penalty by seeking a bench trial but that under New York's this too
was foreclosed. He went on to compare New York's statute with
every other death penalty state, noting "and it appears that no
other jurisdiction permits guilty pleas to capital murder, yet
provides for the imposition of death only after the defendant
contests his guilt before a jury, as New York does." 100
The Judge cited People v. Michael A.C.10 1 in which the New
York Court of Appeals invalidated a section of the Code of Criminal Procedure that conditioned the granting of Youthful Offender status on the defendant waiving his right to a jury trial
as being constitutionally impermissible.
The prosecution sought Article 78 relief from this portion of
the trial court's ruling in the Appellate Division, Second Department by commencing the action Hynes v. Tomei,102 in which
it sought a writ of prohibition against enforcement of the
Judge's order or a declaratory judgment that the statutes were
constitutional. The Second Department reversed Justice
Tomei, relying on the strong presumption that state statutes
are constitutional and holding that the New York statutory
scheme differed from the Federal Kidnapping Act in two respects. Unlike New York's law, the defendant was subjected to
a unitary trial in which the sentence was decided by the jury
without weighing aggravating factors or mitigating factors
which was a process, which was invalidated in Furman v. Georgia.10 3 Additionally, under the federal statute the defendant
could plead guilty at any time, without the consent of the court
or the prosecutor and avoid the death penalty. The New York
State Supreme Court, Appellate Division apparently viewed the
New York restrictions as a safeguard, as Judge Mangano wrote
in Hynes:
Of equal, if not greater, significance is that the defendant in Jackson had complete control of the plea process, i.e., he could plead
guilty as of right to the capital kidnapping charge, and thus could
avoid the death penalty by his own unilateral action, an option
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 481.
People v. Michael A.C., 261 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1970).
Hynes v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687 (App. Div. 1997).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
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which the United States Supreme Court recognized would be difficult to resist. In contrast, the plea bargain provisions at bar prohibit a capital defendant from pleading guilty, as of right, to
murder in the first degree; rather, they merely grant the People
the discretion to enter into a plea bargain agreement with the
capital defendant so as to remove the case from the capital pun10 4
ishment track.
The court went on to cite various United States Supreme
Court and New York Court of Appeals decisions, which recognized plea-bargaining as a vital component of the criminal justice process. In so holding, the court appeared to side-step
Justice Tomei's conclusion that the only way a defendant could
avoid the death penalty under the New York scheme was to give
up the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and a jury trial through a process that required the imprimatur of the prosecution and the court.
During this same period of time, a similar challenge arose
in Relin v. Connell1 0 5 in which the District Attorney sought
identical Article 78 relief from an order of county court Judge
John Connell which invalidated the same statutory provisions,
also relying on United States v. Jackson.0 6 The Fourth Department, citing the holding in Hynes v. Tomei, 10 7 adopted the Second Department's reasoning and reversed the lower court order.
Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
The New York Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision
by Chief Judge Kaye, reversed both Appellate Division decisions.10 8 At the outset of her decision, Judge Kaye initially
observed:
Despite the passage of three decades, a plethora of decisions involving the death penalty and a sea change in plea bargaining,
the Supreme Court has never overruled Jackson, which binds this
Court. Indeed, every other death penalty State has fit its capital
murder plea-bargaining procedures within the rationale of
Jackson. 0 9
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 691 (footnote omitted).
Relin v. Connell, 624 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 1997).
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687.
Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 1203.
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Judge Kaye, like Justice Tomei, went on to note that
shortly after the Supreme Court had decided Jackson, the New
York Court of Appeals invalidated those sections of the Code of
Criminal Procedure that conditioned the granting of Youthful
Offender treatment upon the defendant waiving the right to
trial by jury, utilizing the same rationale as that applied in
Jackson."0 She next rejected the argument that since the statute required the consent of the court and the prosecutor to a
change of plea, and the defendant had no unilateral right to
change the plea to avoid the death penalty, it could not be said
to "needlessly" encourage guilty pleas. Addressing this argument the Judge observed:
The Supreme Court, however, has found approval of a trial
court and a prosecutor irrelevant to the Jackson analysis. Defendants prosecuted under the Federal Kidnapping Act could not
enter a plea of guilty as of right, since Federal Trial Judges had
discretion to reject guilty pleas and jury trial waivers. This judicial involvement did not cure the constitutional problem: the statute's infirmity was not coercion of guilty pleas and jury waivers
but needless encouragement of them. Even though not every
guilty plea to a charge under the Act was necessarily involuntary,
the statute still impermissibly burdened defendants' constitutional rights."'
Judge Kaye reiterated the importance of plea bargaining to
the criminal justice system, but pointed out that the Supreme
Court decision in Corbitt v. New Jersey," 2 which was central to
the argument that the enactment was constitutional, was distinguishable from the New York scheme because, although a
lesser plea could be afforded to a defendant that pled guilty, it
was not guaranteed. 1 3 In striking down sections 220.10(5)(e)
and 220.30(3)(b)(vii) of the Criminal Procedure Law, the New
York State Court of Appeals held that the severability clause in
the legislation allowed the remainder of the law to remain in
effect. 1 4 In invalidating sections 220.10(5)(e) and
220.30(3)(b)(vii) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Judge Kaye
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1203; see also People v. Michael A.C., 761 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1970).
Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1205 (citations omitted).
Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1207.
Id. at 1208.
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recognized that the court had reached an anomalous result in
which plea bargaining would, now, become more difficult than
before since a defendant could not plead guilty while a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty was pending. 115 On this point,
she wrote:
We realize this result will reduce the flexibility of both prosecutors and defendants who wish to plea bargain in capital cases.
Indeed, our reversal in these cases may well have an ironic twist
in that capital defendants will have fewer opportunities to avoid
the possibility of the death penalty. We are also aware that the
Supreme Court has not revisited Jackson and its progeny in 20
years, and that these cases might be decided differently today in
light of the increased significance of plea bargaining and substantial changes in the administration of capital punishment. The
fact remains, however, that although the Supreme Court itself
may revisit its interpretation of Federal constitutional provisions,
State courts are bound under the Federal Constitution to follow
the controlling Supreme Court precedent, and Jackson compels
116
the result here.
This would not be the last time the New York Court of Appeals
would pass upon this issue.
People v. Mateo
As noted previously, People v. Mateo originated in Monroe
County Court before the Honorable John Connell. Among the
plethora of issues raised by the defendant, in addition to those
decided by Hynes," 7 was the constitutionality of section
125.27(1)(a)(xi) of the Penal Law, which made it an aggravating
factor to intentionally cause the death of two or more additional
persons within the state, in separate criminal transactions
within the state, within a period of twenty-four months when
committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme
or plan."18 In this prosecution, the indictment charged that the
defendant acted in a "similar fashion" when he killed four separate victims. The defendant contended that the phrase "similar
fashion" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 1209.
Hynes, 706 N.E.2d 1201.
People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
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Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 11, 12, and 14 of the New York State Constitution as well as
Section 13 of the Civil Rights Law and Section 500 of the Judiciary Law. 119
In denying this motion, Judge Connell conducted both a
thorough and interesting analysis, pointing out what had been
included and omitted from the various statutes comprising the
death penalty enactment as well as pattern Criminal Jury Instructions. He then pointed out that the prosecution had not
defined this term or the term "common scheme or plan" for the
grand jury. 120 In order to shed some light on what was meant
by the Legislature and the Governor, he referenced both the Assembly Codes Committee and the Governor's approval memorandum which indicated that the section was directed at "serial
killers."' 21 The court next parsed the meanings of the phrases
"in a similar fashion" and "common scheme or plan" citing the
various definitions other courts and Black's Law Dictionary
have given to each phrase pointing out that "common scheme or
22
plan" has been used interchangeably with modus operandi.1
It then engaged in an analysis of the prosecution's position regarding this phrase as well as the term "serial killer," writing:
The People maintain that similar "includes a spectrum of
meanings between the poles of same and different" (Answering
Affirmation, AM-9). The breadth of distance between same and
different and the bewildering variances of rulings as described by
Wigmore make it obvious that clear and objective standards providing specific and detailed guidance to a jury is questionable
given the lack of clarity in this statute. Not lost on this Court is
the significant absence in the Practice Commentaries to Penal
Law § 125.27(1)(a)(xi) and the Criminal Jury Instructions of a recommended definition of similarfashion.
The People urge that the term similarfashion has a commonsense core of meaning and is, therefore, easily understood by de-

fendants and juries. The People also contend that the term serial
killer does not require any more than a showing of a consecutive
number of killings. Certainly the context in which the statute
119. Id.
120. Id. at 998.

121. Id.
122. Id.
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was debated and passed by the Legislature, signed into law by the
Governor and promoted by those two branches of government was
aimed at protecting the public from the Son of Sam, Ted Bundy
and Arthur Shawcross-type serial killers. They are generally defined as persons who commit several homicides, separated in time
and frequently in different geographic locations. Most are serial
sexual killers who are compelled to exercise absolute control, both
physical and mental, before inflicting torture, pain and ultimate
death. The manner in which death is inflicted is frequently characterized by a ritualistic signature aspect, i.e. mutilation, cannibalism, sexual contact. Firearms are the least common weapons
used by such serial killers. Finally, the crime scenes of the killers
tend to be similar, using the same method of killing and similar
crime scene arrangements.
In alleging that the four murders set forth in Counts 11 & 12
were committed in a similar fashion, the People advance these
similarities: All involved young men, shot with firearms to the
left side of the head, on the west side of the City of Rochester, and
in a cold-blooded fashion.
However, as the People also acknowledge, dissimilarities are
important in analyzing the serial murder allegation: Victims: one
victim was a 16 year old African-American male. Three were 19to 20-year old male Hispanics. Instrumentalities: a .45 caliber
hand gun, a .357 caliber hand gun, a .25 caliber handgun and a
12-gauge shotgun. Motives: One contract shooting that began as a
kneecapping and resulted in a homicide; one unplanned victim
who was a companion of the contract shooting victim; one drive-by
shooting as a revenge for an earlier robbery committed by the victim and one shooting driven by the defendant's desire to locate a
former girlfriend. Defendant as Shooter: The defendant is alleged
to be the shooter of the companion to the contract shooting victim
and in the drive-by shooting. An unindicted accomplice is alleged
to have shot the contract victim. The People are unsure if the defendant shot or commanded the shooting of the 4th victim.
Wounds: One with shotgun wounds to the neck in the drive-by;
one with multiple gunshot wounds to the head, abdomen, chest
and neck; one with multiple gunshot wounds to the head, chest
and hip; and one with a single shot to the head whose head was
thereafter covered with a plastic bag. Location: Two on a public
sidewalk during the same incident; one as he sat in the car on a
public street and one in the defendant's basement while handcuffed and blindfolded.
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The People argue that the common element of death by gunshot makes these four homicides serial killings of a similar fashion. They ask this Court to reject a Molineux standard in
interpreting similar fashion and accept a spectrum of meanings
between the poles of same and different.
The reliance of the People on People v. Condon to support the
position that similarity should not be confused with modus operandi is questionable. The Condon court specifically noted that
the signature-type crime of a serial killer (i.e. Jack the Ripper)
could establish such unique characteristics that proof of similar
acts of the defendant would be probative of the fact that he committed the crime alleged.
There is nothing so unique, ritualistic, signature-like about
these homicides that would support the Grand Jury's decision to
indict the defendant under this statute. Even the geographic similarities of the homicide locations proffered by the People are not
obvious from a review of the Grand Jury minutes.
To accept the examples of similarity presented by the People,
a person who shoots the requisite number of victims within the
city limits during the prescribed period, thereby causing their
death, would fit the definition of a serial killer for the purposes of
this statute. Clearly the Legislature did not intend such a
result.123
Ultimately the court determined that the evidence before the
grand jury was insufficient to support the theory that the homicides constituted "serial killings" since they lacked sufficient
common characteristics that would render them "signaturelike" in nature and it dismissed these counts of the indictment,
however, not before expressing its reservations about the constitutionality of the statute, observing:
While the vagueness of the law concerning similar fashion
underscores "several difficult issues that remain to be resolved in
its application," it does not appear to this Court that this portion
of the statute should be struck down on constitutional grounds by
24
a trial level judge at this point in the proceedings of this case.'
One of the most interesting features of Judge Connell's decision is his conclusion that this particular section of the statute
is apparently aimed exclusively at "serial killers" despite the
123. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 998-1000 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 1000 (citations omitted).
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fact that this term is not utilized in the statute itself nor defined
as such. In the Practice Commentary accompanying the section, the author, William Donnino, characterizes the section as
such but the only case law offered in support of this view is People v. Fiore.125 A reading of Fiore,126 however, reveals that it is
not a case dealing with a homicide prosecution but rather one
involving bribery in which the meaning of the phrase "common
scheme or plan" is addressed. While some support for Judge
Connell's view is found in the memoranda accompanying the
legislation as cited by him in the opinion, the Fourth Department expressed a reluctance to adopt that view when the case
came to it on appeal. On appeal the Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, affirmed the dismissal based on the factual insufficiency before the grand jury, holding:
In dismissing those counts, the court concluded that the People's
evidence before the Grand Jury was insufficient to establish that
the murders were committed "in a similar fashion". In reaching
that conclusion, the court interpreted "in a similar fashion" to
mean serial killings, i.e., unique, ritualistic or signature-like slayings. The People contend that the court should have given the
phrase "in a similar fashion" its plain meaning and thus should
have concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient.
Even affording the phrase "in a similar fashion" its plain
meaning, we conclude that the evidence before the Grand Jury
was legally insufficient. The record establishes that the defendant's motive and method in each of the four murders were different and that the circumstances surrounding each of the murders
were different. Because the murders did not adequately resemble
each other with respect to motive, method and surrounding cir12 7
cumstances, they were not committed "in a similar fashion".
The Supreme Court Appellate Didvision, however, declined
to address the lower court's interpretation of the applicability to
"serial killers" or the constitutionality of the section noting:
In view of our determination, it is unnecessary to review the propriety of the court's conclusion that Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(xi)
applies only to serial killings. In addition, because defendant
125. William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL
§ 125.27(1)(a)(xi) (McKinney 1997).
126. People v. Fiore, 312 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1974).
127. People v. Mateo, 672 N.Y.S.2d 594, 594 (App. Div. 1998).

LAw
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is
does not argue before us that the phrase "in a similar fashion"
128
unconstitutionally vague, we do not address that issue.
Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was
granted by Chief Judge Kaye and the court affirmed the dismissal. Judge Wesley, writing for a unanimous bench, opined:
We agree with the lower court determinations that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was insufficient to establish
that the killings at issue here were "committed in a similar fashion" pursuant to Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(xi) and therefore
affirm.
It is clear that the Legislature and the Governor intended the
phrase "committed in a similar fashion" to include serial killings.
Contrary to defendant's contention, however, this phrase does not
have a well-settled legal meaning in our jurisprudence.
In analyzing this phrase, County Court looked to our case law
concerning the identity exception for the admission of uncharged
crimes at trial, first articulated in People v. Molineux. This exception is used in limited circumstances, when the defendant employs some unique, unusual, or distinctive modus operandi in an
uncharged crime that is relevant to proving his identity as the
perpetrator of the crime charged. Although County Court correctly held that the proof fell short of establishing that the crimes
were "committed in a similar fashion," we disagree with its conclusion that these cases establish a template for defining the
phrase "committed in a similar fashion" under Penal Law
§ 125.27(1)(a)(xi). The precise phrase is not used in our Molineux
line of cases, and nothing in the history of the death penalty statute suggests that the Legislature intended to adopt either rationale or the standards governing the identity evidentiary
exception to define this classification of capital murder. 129
In a footnote to this discussion in the opinion, the Judge
wrote:
Moreover, although County Court determined that there was
"nothing so unique, ritualistic, [or] signature-like" about these
homicides, it misinterpreted our Molineux jurisprudence in this
regard. This Court has articulated the identity exception standard as "unique," "unusual" and "distinctive." However, in Beam
we explicitly stated that in order to establish a modus operandi,
128. Id.
129. People v. Mateo, 712 N.E.2d 692, 694-95 (N.Y. 1999) (citations omitted).
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"it is not necessary that the pattern be ritualisticfor it to be consid130
ered unique."
While the New York Court of Appeals confirmed that this
particular section was meant to apply to "serial killings" it left
open the question of whether it was exclusive to them, or
whether "serial killings" were merely one subset of the class of
homicides it embraced. Moreover, it expressly declined to offer
any guidance on this subject or more precision to the phrase at
issue, declaring:
Both defendant and the People ask us to fashion a set of criteria to define the requirements of the statutory phrase at issue;
they ask us to provide a calculus of "similarity" by which all future cases might be plotted. To do so, however, would ignore the
relative nature and contextual considerations inherent in any
analysis and application of the "similarity" element. For this reason, the typical process by which this Court fulfills its adjudicative responsibility in setting prospective, applied
particularization does not lend itself to a more definite resolution
of the nature of "similarity" beyond the determination of the facts
31
presented in this case.'
People v. Couser
People v. Couser arose out of a prosecution for murder in
the first degree in Onondaga County Court in 1977.132 Unlike
the prosecutions in both Hale'33 and Mateo, 3 4 no notice of intent
to seek the death penalty had been filed. Among the theories in
the indictment was a count charging the defendant with the offense of murder in the first degree pursuant to section
125.27(1)(a)(vii) of the Penal Law. The defendant moved to dismiss this count alleging that the statute was void for vagueness.
In agreeing with this conclusion, the court began its analysis by
reviewing the section itself, writing:
In enacting this statute, the legislature sought to craft a felony murder provision like that set forth in § 125.25(3) of the Pe130. Id. at 695 n.2 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 695.
132. The author was the Trial Court Judge in these proceedings and also the
author of the two decisions reported at 674 N.Y.S.2d 887 (County Ct. 1998).
133. People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
134. People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981, 988-91 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
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nal Law, albeit with a significantly expanded list of predicate
felonies. Moreover, while § 125.25(3)(a) of the Penal Law makes
it an affirmative defense that the accused, "Did not commit the
homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune,
cause or aid the commission thereof", this section only imposes
accessorial liability for the crime where the People have proven as
an element that the accused ". . . commanded another person to
cause the death of the victim or intended victim." (Penal Law
§ 125.27 [11 [a] [vii]). Unfortunately, neither the legislature nor the
about what constitutes a "comcourts have given any guidance
135
statute.
this
under
mand"
137
the
Citing Zant v. Stephens 136 and Gregg v. Georgia,
court observed that the statute, to be constitutional, "[must contain] an aggravating circumstance [which] generally narrow[s]
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty" and that the
discretion afforded the sentencing body "must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action." 138 The court went on to find, however
that:

While the section at issue initially appears to fulfill these requirements since it narrows the accomplice liability to a single
concept, "command", and places the burden of establishing it on
the People, the failure to define what constitutes a "command" either under § 20.00 or § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) of the Penal Law renders
139
the statute impermissibly vague.
The court took note of the fact that the same issue had been
raised and decided in People v. Mateo,140 in which Judge Connell
wrote:
The defendant also challenges the phrase "commanded another person" as being unconstitutionally vague. The defendant's
argument is unpersuasive. The term "command" has been used in
the Penal Law for many years under § 20.00. This phrase, under
Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii), limits the application of accessorial
liability to those situations where an individual commands an135. People v. Couser, 674 N.Y.S.2d 887, 888 (County Ct. 1998).
136. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
137. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
138. Couser, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 888 (citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; Gregg, 428
U.S. at 189).
139. Id. at 888-89.
140. People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
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other person to intentionally cause the death of another
individual.
Here, the common sense meaning of "command" should be applied: "To direct, with authority. Power to dominate and control."
(Black's Law Dictionary 267 [6th ed. 1990]). The use of the
phrase "commanded another person" under the statute is sufficient to put the defendant on notice that it is a crime to order
another person to intentionally cause the death of Juan Rodriguez-Matos. This phrase also limits the type of conduct that can
bebe charged under this statute by law enforcement personnel
141
cause of the limited application of accessorial liability.
The court, in declining to adopt this position, conducted a
further analysis of that undertaken by Judge Connell, writing
that:
The problem with the analysis in Mateo, supra, is that while
Judge Connell correctly observes that the term has been included
in § 20.00 of the Penal Law since 1965, and it limits the application of the type of accessorial liability which can be charged under
this statute, it still begs the question of what constitutes a "command." Additionally, the utilization of the "common sense" meaning derived from Black's Law Dictionary 267 (6th Ed.) invites
grand jurors and trial jurors throughout the state to apply their
own personal subjective interpretation in determining the existence or non-existence of an aggravating factor in a capital ease
[sic]. 142

In a footnote to this discussion, the Judge utilized Black's
Law Dictionary to compare all of the terms set forth in section
20.00 of the Penal Law to demonstrate that they were so synonymous with one another as to make them interchangeable, "if
not circular.' 14 3 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed.14 4 Judge Wisner, reviewing the body of capital case law jurisprudence, cited Tison v. Arizona'145 as
authority for the proposition that one who plays a major role in
the underlying felony that leads to the death of another may be
an appropriate candidate for the death penalty. He then went
on to hold that the standard applied in the lower court analysis
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 989.
Couser, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
Id. at 889 n.1.
People v. Couser, 695 N.Y.S.2d 781 (App. Div. 1999).
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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was an incorrect one, observing "The People argue that the
court erred in analyzing the constitutionality of clause (vii) of
Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a) from an Eighth Amendment perspective. We agree. Because this is not a death penalty case, defendant's vagueness argument should be measured by due process,
not Eighth Amendment, standards. "146
After reviewing the statute's procedural provisions requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the death penalty is sought,
Judge Wisner continued his analysis:
It is because each clause of Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a) defines
not only a crime but also eligibility for the death penalty that the
court measured the constitutionality of clause (vii) by Eighth
Amendment standards. The issue, however, is not whether that
clause is sufficiently definite to serve as an aggravating factor establishing eligibility for the death penalty. The issue is whether
that clause is sufficiently definite to serve as the statutory definition of a crime. A determination that the clause is sufficiently
definite to serve as the basis for a criminal prosecution would not
be inconsistent with a determination that it is not sufficiently definite to serve as the basis for the imposition of the death
penalty.147
The court, holding that the lower court erred in applying an
Eighth Amendment analysis to the statute, stated the "[e]ighth
Amendment analysis is an 'anomaly of the Supreme Court's
death penalty jurisprudence. Simply put, death is different ....
That difference creates a unique 'need for reliability on the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' Those concerns are not present here.' "148
The court thereupon, resting on the presumption of constitutionality, applied the test enunciated in People v. Bright,149
that "[fiirst, the statute must provide sufficient notice of what
conduct is prohibited; second, the statute must not be written in
such a manner as to permit or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement ....
146. Couser, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
147. Id. (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 786 (quoting Holman v. Page, 95 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1996);
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 (1983)).
149. People v. Bright, 520 N.E.2d 1355 (N.Y. 1988).
150. Id. at 1358.
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It then adopted a definition similar to that proposed in People v. Mateo'5 1 "to direct authoritatively" that was taken from
152
Webster Third International Dictionary.
Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals had the last
word on this particular issue. In an opinion by Judge Bellacosa,
the court held that the defendant had standing to challenge the
statute on "a standard due process vagueness assertion." 15 3
Turning to the issue of the word "command," the Judge wrote:
We are persuaded that, under a standard due process appraisal, the commonly accepted meaning of "command" for ordinary legal and constitutional purposes is "to direct
authoritatively." It is also significant that a "command" is the
only type of accomplice liability activity for which a confederate
can become liable for murder in the first degree. This selective
precision manifests the Legislature's confidence and understanding that the word "command" is a distinctive term that is different
from "solicits," "requests," or "importunes."
Further, there has been virtually no judicial churning concerning the term "command," despite its longevity in New York
jurisprudence. Evidently, parsed interpretation of this ordinary
word has not been deemed necessary. Indeed, it is notable that
the term "commands" was retained throughout the development
of the accomplice liability statute, while other terms have been
recast. "Command" very likely did not have to be changed because it consistently "'[sic] conveys sufficiently definite warning
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common under54
standing and practices." '"[sic] 1

The analysis by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, perhaps, raises more questions than are answered. Most
troubling is the apparent reliance on Maynard v. Cartwright,155
to validate the statute recognizing that while "the clause is sufficiently definite to serve as the basis for a criminal prosecution" it may not be "sufficiently definite to serve as the basis for
the imposition of the death penalty." 15 6 Recognizing that the
151. People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
152. Couser, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 787 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD

INT'L DICTIONARY

455).
153.

People v. Couser, 730 N.E.2d 953, 955 (N.Y. 2000).
154. Id. at 956 (citations omitted).
155. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1988).
156. Couser, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
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statute may be utilized in both non-capital cases, like Couser, as
well as capital cases one is left to wonder whether the definition
of "command" may then be more elastic in the former rather
than the latter. Indeed, a reading of that portion of Maynard v.
Cartwright,157 cited by the Fourth Department, seems to compel
the very opposite conclusion. There, Justice White, rejecting
the State of Oklahoma's attempt to salvage the portion of the
capital sentence which was attacked as also being vague, wrote:
The difficulty with the State's argument is that it presents a
Due Process Clause approach to vagueness and fails to recognize
the rationale of our cases construing and applying the Eighth
Amendment. Objections to vagueness under the Due Process
Clause rest on the lack of notice, and hence may be overcome in
any specific case where reasonable persons would know that their
conduct is at risk. Vagueness challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light of the facts
of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied basis.
Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances defined in capital punishment statutes are analyzed under the
Eighth Amendment and characteristically assert that the challenged provision fails adequately to inform juries what they must
find to impose the death penalty and as a result leaves them and
was
appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which
15
held invalid in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 8
By applying a standard due process analysis to a statute
that could be utilized to impose the death penalty, both the
Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals appear
to have left open the prospect of an Eighth Amendment heightened due process challenge in the future.
Finally, it is obvious from a reading of both opinions, as
well as People v. Mateo, 59 that no uniform, precise definition of
"command" existed regardless of how much one was claimed. In
Mateo, Judge Connell settled on "[t]o direct with authority.
Power to dominate and control." 60 In People v. Couser, Judge

157. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361-62.

158. Id. (citations omitted).
159. People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
160. Id. at 989 (citing BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990)).
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Wisner settled for " '[tlo direct authoritatively,' i.e., 'to give or-

der or orders.'

"161

In the New York Court of Appeals, Judge Bellacosa not only
162
adopted both of them, but cited a 1907 case, People v. Farmer,
as an illustration of how it might have been viewed. With the
exception of this single illustration, none of the courts that considered this term could cite a case in which it had been construed or defined. Moreover, the Judge touted the fact that
"there has been virtually no judicial churning concerning the
term 'command,' despite its longevity in New York
163
jurisprudence."
Neither has New York ever attempted to pin capital liability on a defendant utilizing this principle. Whether it will survive an Eighth Amendment analysis remains to be seen.
Matter of Francois v. Dolan
In Matter of Francois v. Dolan,164 the New York Court of
Appeals revisited the issue of when a defendant may enter a
guilty plea to an indictment charging the crime of murder in the
first degree pursuant to section 125.27 of the Penal Law.
This case arose in Dutchess County Court where the defendant was charged with eight counts of murder in the first degree pursuant to section 125.27(1)(a)(xi) of the Penal Law, the
"serial killer" provision and lesser offenses. 165 The relevant
facts were laid out by Judge Levine, who recounted:
On October 8, 1998, a Dutchess County Grand Jury indicted
petitioner Kendall Francois on eight counts of murder in the first
degree, as defined under New York's 1995 death penalty legislation .... He was arraigned on the indictment and entered a plea
of not guilty. Pursuant to CPL 250.40(2), Francois' arraignment
marked the beginning of a 120-day period within which the District Attorney was authorized to serve a notice of intent to seek
the death penalty. In November, the District Attorney wrote to
the Capital Defender Office inviting the submission of any mitiga161. People v. Couser, 695 N.Y.S.2d 781, 787 (App. Div. 1999) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIoNARY 455).

162.
163.
164.
165.

People v. Farmer, 89 N.E. 462 (N.Y. 1909).
People v. Couser, 730 N.E.2d 953, 956 (N.Y. 2000).
Francois v. Dolan, 731 N.E.2d 614 (N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 615.
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tion information the defense might request the prosecutor to consider in determining whether to seek the death penalty.
On December 22, 1998, before the District Attorney either
filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty or announced his
intention not to do so, this Court decided Matter of Hynes v.
Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177, 706 N.E.2d 1201, cert.
denied 527 U.S. 1015, 119 S.Ct. 2359, 144 L.Ed.2d 254 ....
On December 23, the day following the decision . . . still
before a death penalty notice had been filed by the District Attorney in this case, petitioner made an uncalendared appearance
before County Court, Dutchess County, in which he offered to
plead guilty to the entire indictment. The District Attorney opposed acceptance of the plea and, the following day, filed a death
penalty notice. County Court reserved decision on the guilty plea
166
offer and later rendered a decision refusing to accept the plea.
Thereafter, the defendant commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division, Second Department seeking a
writ of mandamus compelling Judge Dolan to accept his plea of
guilty. 167 The court denied the petition and dismissed the writ,
holding:
"[Pirohibition is available only where there is a clear legal
right, and then only when a court-in cases where judicial authority is challenged-acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers." The extraordinary
remedy of mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a
ministerial act, and only when there exists a clear legal right to
68
the relief sought.1
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment holding that the more specific provision of section
250.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which allows the prosecution a 120-day period in which to decide whether to seek the
death penalty, trumped the general plea provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law set out in sections 220.10(2) and 220.60(2)
that allow a defendant to enter a plea to the whole indictment
166. Id. at 615-16.
167. Francois v. Dolan, 693 N.Y.S.2d 198 (App. Div. 1999).
168. Id. at 198-99 (quoting Rondon v. Kohm, 644 N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Div.
1996)) (additional citations omitted).
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as a matter of right. 169 Judge Levine, rejecting the Petitioner's
argument, wrote:
For several reasons we reject this argument and hold that until the completion of the statutorily provided deliberative process,
either by the filing of a death penalty notice, announcement of an
intention not to seek that sanction, or by the expiration of the
statutory period to make that decision, a capital defendant does
not have an unqualified right to plead guilty to the entire indictment. Thus to the extent that there is a conflict between sections
220.10(2) and 220.60(2), on the one hand, and the provision giving
the District Attorney the authority to decide whether to seek the
death penalty and a period to deliberate on that decision (see, CPL
0
250.40), the latter provisions prevails. 17
While, at first blush, it appears that the court has given
back to the prosecution what it took away in Hynes v. Tomei,' 7'
i.e., the right to block a defendant's entry of a guilty plea to an
indictment to avoid the death penalty, it did so with some qualification. It may do so, only during the 120-day period allowed
pursuant to section 250.40 and that power is curtailed by either
of two events; the filing of the notice to seek the death penalty
or the announcement that it will not be sought. In restoring
this qualified right to the prosecution, Judge Levine emphasized the importance of two considerations enacted in the 1995
legislation:
First, the defendant could thereby prevent the prosecution from
pursuing the death penalty even after a notice of intent to seek
the death penalty was filed under CPL 250.40(1). This is because
there is no provision for impaneling a jury for the required death
penalty sentencing stage after a guilty plea to capital murder.
Thus, the only legal sentence upon a guilty plea would be either
life imprisonment without parole or a term of years in prison. In
order to avoid this result, in Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, we construed the statute, as a whole, not to permit a capital defendant to
exercise an unqualified right to plead guilty to murder in the first
degree while a death penalty notice was pending.
Second, in entering a plea to capital murder, a defendant
could preclude the District Attorney from even exercising the statutory right to consider, over time (weighing aggravating and miti169. Francois,731 N.E.2d at 616 (citations omitted).
170. Id.

171. Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
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gating factors), whether to seek the ultimate sanction in a capital
172
murder case.

The court was not unmindful of the consequences of this holding, observing:
Finally, we should not ignore the unintended and untoward
effects of a contrary ruling. As this case illustrates, and County
Court pointed out, it would inevitably result, in the most heinous
and high profile cases, in an unseemly race to the courthouse between the defense and the prosecution to see whether a guilty
plea or notice of intent to seek the death penalty will be filed first.
The need for the precipitous action to file a death penalty notice
before the plea was offered would undeniably preclude the thorough, fully deliberative decision making on whether to seek the
death penalty that the Legislature contemplated, and one would
hope a District Attorney would employ, in the exercise of that official's profound responsibilities conferred under the present death
173
penalty statute.
It is therefore clear, that despite the court's earlier invalidation of sections 220.10(5)(e) and 220.30(3)(b)(vii) of the Criminal Procedure Law, which purported to restrict the right of a
defendant to enter a guilty plea, there is still no way for a defendant to avoid the death penalty that does not require the prosecution's consent. The ink was hardly dry on Judge Kaye's
warning in Hynes v. Tomei, that "[w]e realize this result will
reduce the flexibility of both prosecutors and defendants who
wish to plea bargain in capital cases"17 4 before the prosecution
and defense tried to find ways around the holding in the trial
courts. For example, less than one month later in Monroe
County Court, Judge Marks authored a decision in People v.
Van Dyne,175 in which she set forth the willingness of the defendant to enter a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree and
"[t] he district attorney specifically conditions the withdrawal of
the notice of intent to seek the death penalty upon the entry of a
plea of guilty and reserves the right to reinstate the notice if the
1 76
plea is not entered or is withdrawn."
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Francois, 731 N.E.2d at 616 (citations omitted).
Id. at 617.
Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1209.
People v. Van Dyne, 685 N.Y.S.2d 591 (County Ct. 1999).
Id. at 593.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss1/1

32

20031

DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE

The Judge went on to discuss the holding of Hynes v.
Tomei, including the right of a defendant to plead guilty where
no notice of intent to seek the death penalty is pending. Additionally she noted that the New York Court of Appeals had not
invalidated the plea provisions of section 220.60(2)(a) of the
Criminal Procedure Law, which allows a defendant to enter a
plea of guilty to part of the indictment with the consent of the
court and prosecution, and concluded:
The defendant in this case has sought the Court's acceptance
of a plea of guilty to Murder in the First Degree immediately after
the withdrawal of the notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
The defendant has set forth other valid reasons for the withdrawal of his not guilty plea.
The Court therefore concludes that the plea may be accepted
based upon the defendant's knowing, intelligent and voluntary
waiver of rights and consistent with the recent decision of the
177
Court of Appeals and thus so orders the acceptance of the plea.
It is extremely doubtful that the District Attorney could
have validly "reinstated" the notice of intent to seek the death
penalty, had the defendant repudiated the agreement, given the
prohibition in section 250.40(4) of the Criminal Procedure Law
from doing so.
Indeed, this potential problem led to a different process being utilized several months later in People v. Smelefsky, 178 in
Supreme Court, Queens County. There, Judge Fisher after reviewing the procedure followed in Van Dyne, wrote "[tihe Court
rejected the District Attorney's proposal, first because conditional plea bargains are generally disfavored in New York, and
second because a 'conditional' withdrawal seemed irreconcilable
with the unambiguous statutory provision that 'once withdrawn
[a] notice of intent to seek the death penalty may not be refiled.'
"179

However, due to the unique circumstances of the case, the
court was able to devise a procedure to accomplish the plea bargain. Smelefsky was charged with murder in the first degree
and lesser included offenses in two indictments involving differ177. Id. at 594.
178. People v. Smelefsky, 695 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
179. Id. at 691 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 250.40(4)) (additional citations omitted).
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ent co-defendants and different victims. The court took the defendant through a complete allocution of the rights he was
waiving in entering a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree
on one indictment as well as a factual admission concerning his
conduct:
The Court then turned to the prosecutor who was apparently
satisfied with the allocution. In one breath, he consented to the
plea, withdrew the notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and
joined in the defendant's application that the plea be accepted and
entered. The Court immediately granted the application, and ordered the plea entered.1 80
The defendant was then allowed to enter pleas of guilty of
murder in the second degree and other offenses to satisfy the
second indictment and was sentenced consecutively to the life
without parole that was the plea bargained sentence on the first
indictment. In discussing the reasons the plea allocution did
not run afoul of Hynes v. Tomei, Judge Fisher wrote:
Although a notice of intent was pending against the defendant here, the parties did not violate Matter of Hynes v. Tomei,
supra, by engaging in serious plea negotiations. Among other possibilities, they could have reached an agreement not involving a
plea to first-degree murder and therefore not requiring the withdrawal of the notice of intent at all. Moreover, since a filed notice
of intent may be withdrawn "at any time," a defendant must have
the opportunity to persuade the prosecutor to withdraw it,
whether or not the inducement includes a guilty plea.
The agreement reached here involved a guilty plea to firstdegree murder, and therefore it could not have been given effect
while the notice of intent remained pending. To be sure, the notice could have been withdrawn before the plea was proffered by
the defendant in court. But where the agreed-upon sentence is
life without parole, many prosecutors are reluctant to withdraw
the notice of intent prior to the plea and to rely simply upon the
defendant's representation that he or she will thereafter plead
guilty and accept that sentence. Because a withdrawn notice may
never be re-filed, prosecutors understandably fear that, following
an apparently irreversible withdrawal of the notice, the defendant
will renege on the promise, renounce the bargain, and refuse to
enter the plea.
180. Id. at 692 (footnote omitted).
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In the case at bar, because of that expressed concern, the
prosecutor was permitted to withhold his consent to the plea and
his withdrawal of the notice of intent until after the defendant
had proffered his plea to the court and undergone a complete allocution. Because that sequence narrowed the window of opportunity for the defendant to renounce the bargain, it fortified the
prosecutor's resolve to go forward with it. And since the defendant claimed also to be seeking the disposition, he could have no
legitimate complaint that the sequence unfairly infringed upon
his right to renege.
Moreover, the procedure was not inconsistent with the Court
of Appeals holding that "a defendant may not plead guilty to first
degree murder while a notice of intent to seek the death penalty is
pending."
In New York, a guilty plea carrying a promised sentence cannot be entered without the permission of the Court, even where
both the prosecution and defense recommend it. Thus, it is the
acceptance by the Court, and not the proffer by the defendant,
that makes a guilty plea cognizable. As the Court of Appeals has
said, "there is no basis for judicial recognition of a plea bargain
until it is concluded by entry on the record." And the Supreme
Court itself has held that a guilty plea does not implicate any constitutionally protected interest of a defendant until it is "embodied in the judgment of a court."
I hold, therefore, that a guilty plea to murder in the first degree is valid under Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, so long as no notice
of intent to seek the death penalty is pending when the Court accepts and enters the plea.' 8 '
Like the procedure presented in Van Dyne, in which the
court allowed a "conditional" withdrawal of the notice of intent
to seek the death penalty, it is questionable whether this process would have been sanctioned by an appeals court had an
appeal been taken. As the court implicitly recognized in a footnote, 8 2 section 250.40(4) of the Criminal Procedure Law requires "a written notice of withdrawal filed with the court and
served on the defendant." 18 3 If this statutory provision were
strictly applied then a violation of the holding in Hynes v.
Tomei, clearly occurred. Moreover, while section 220.60 of the
181. Id. at 694-95 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 692 n.3.
183. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 250.40(4) (McKinney 2003).
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Criminal Procedure Law sets forth the conditions under which
a defendant may plead guilty to the offenses charged in an indictment, the cases construing its provisions suggest that the
factual colloquy by the defendant admitting his culpability is
just as much a part of the plea as the incantation, "I plead
guilty." On this point the cases are legion that the factual admissions which accompany the plea may not be later utilized
against a defendant where the plea is later vacated or withdrawn.'84 In Smelefesky, the court, in its written decision
describing the procedure utilized, indicated that the defendant
"described his participation in, and the circumstances surrounding, the Capobianco homicide" 18 5 before the notice was
withdrawn, thereby further complicating the issue of whether
Hynes v. Tomei was violated. Both decisions would become the
subject of discussion in People v. Edwards.
People v. Edwards
In People v. Edwards,18 6 the defendant was indicted for
murder in the first degree pursuant to sections 125.27(1)(a)(vi)
and (b) of the N.Y. Penal Law. On October 16, 1998, two
months before Hynes v. Tomei18 7 was decided, the defendant
pled guilty to murder in the first degree in exchange for an indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life.1 88 Following the
decision in Hynes and prior to sentencing, he sought to withdraw his plea claiming that it was invalid. In denying the motion, Judge Bartlett wrote:
Defendant Edwards has raised no issue regarding his plea except the alleged legal infirmity articulated in Hynes v. Tomei. He
does not challenge his plea as involuntary or unknowing or unintelligent. Nor is there any indication, now or at the time of the
184. See People v. Moore, 489 N.E.2d 1295 (N.Y. 1985); People v. Latham, 689
N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1997).
185. Smelefsky, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
186. People v. Edwards, 690 N.Y.S.2d 404 (County Ct. 1999).
187. Hynes v. Tomei, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
188. The defendant and one of his co-defendants had previously unsuccessfully challenged the provisions of CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 2000), involving the life and death qualification of jurors and the death penalty pursuant to
sections 125.27 of the Penal Law and 400.27 of the Criminal Procedure Law. People v. Arroyo, 674 N.Y.S.2d 885 (County Ct. 1998) (hereinafter discussed). As part
of his plea bargain Edwards was required to testify against Arroyo and a third codefendant, McKinley.
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guilty plea, that the defendant believes he is innocent. The defendant's position is quite simply that Hynes v. Tomei automatically
requires withdrawal of this otherwise valid plea. 89

The court then went on to describe the procedure followed
in which the defendant entered his plea. Initially it was contemplated that the plea would be entered while the notice of
intent to seek the death penalty was pending and thereafter be
withdrawn at the time of sentencing but:
After some discussion and a recess, during which the Defendant
conferred with his attorney and the District Attorney considered
his position, the District Attorney agreed to withdraw the notice
of intent at the time of the plea and the plea agreement was
amended accordingly.
Following the plea allocution by the defendant, the District
Attorney withdrew the notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
The Court then, after considering the plea allocution of the defendant and the withdrawal of the notice of intent, accepted the
guilty plea and allowed it to be entered. Consequently, when the
plea was entered, the notice of intent had been withdrawn with no
conditions attached which would allow for reinstatement. At the
very least, the plea was allocuted in conjunction with the withdrawal of the notice of intent. 90

In discussing the propriety of the procedure followed, Judge
Bartlett seized on language from Hynes, quoting:
Thus, while a defendant may not plead guilty to first degree murder while a notice of intent to seek the death penalty is pending,
plea bargaining to lesser offenses even when a notice of intent is
pending or to first degree murder in the absence of a notice of
intent, remains unaffected. Consequently, the Court finds that
Defendant's plea entered after the notice of intent was withdrawn, or entered in conjunction with the withdrawal of the notice of intent, remains valid under the precepts of Hynes v.
Tomei.19 1

On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department took
an entirely different view than that of the trial court and Judge
189. Edwards, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
190. Id. at 405-06.
191. Id. at 406 (additional citations and emphasis omitted) (quoting Hynes v.
Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1209 (N.Y. 1998)).
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Fisher in People v. Smelefsky. After describing the procedures
used in both cases, the court held:
We find this scheme flawed because it overlooks the essence
of the Hynes-Jackson infirmity. That constitutional infirmity
arises not from the entry of a guilty plea to murder in the first
degree while a death notice is pending, but from the requirement
placed upon a defendant to choose between pleading guilty to
murder in the first degree or opting for trial while a death notice
is pending. If a prosecutor who has served a death notice is permitted to delay its withdrawal until after a defendant's plea allocution, then the choice to plead guilty has been made under
compulsion of the death notice and a defendant's 5th and 6th
Amendment rights have been impermissibly burdened. In our
view, the mere proffer of a plea bargain to murder in the first degree while a death notice is pending presents a capital defendant
with the same unconstitutional choice faced by the defendants in
Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, supra and Matter of Relin v. Connell, 92
N.Y.2d 613, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177, 706 N.E.2d 1201, namely, "exercise
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and risk death, or abandon
those rights and avoid the possibility of death" (Matterof Hynes v.
Tomei, supra, at 626, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177, 706 N.E.2d 1201). Thus,
we find that it is constitutionally impermissible for prosecutors to
negotiate guilty pleas to murder in the first degree while a notice
92
of intent to seek the death penalty is pending.
The court reversed the defendant's conviction, vacated the
plea and sentence and reinstated the notice of intent to seek the
death penalty. 193 On further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the defendant's conviction 194 cit192. People v. Edwards, 712 N.Y.S.2d 71, 75 (App. Div. 2000).
193. The court additionally decided that the defendant's waiver of appeal as
part of the plea agreement did not deprive him of the right to have his case reviewed because the defendant could not have known of the constitutional infirmity
of the statutory provisions pursuant to which his plea was entered and that "public
policy" as well as "the integrity of the criminal justice system did not allow for such
a waiver." Id. at 74.
194. On October 21, 1998, five days after the defendant had entered his plea
pursuant to the previously described plea agreement, see supra note 192, Edwards'
co-defendant, Arroyo, reached a plea agreement with prosecutors which allowed
her to plead guilty to murder in the first degree and receive an indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life in exchange for her testimony against the remaining co-defendant, McKinley. Following McKinley's acquittal, Arroyo tried to
withdraw her plea claiming that it violated Hynes v.Tomei, as well as having been
entered while she was under the duress of a prospective capital prosecution. The
motion was denied. See People v. Arroyo, 691 N.Y.S.2d 734 (County Ct. 1999).
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ing Brady v. United States,195 in which the Supreme Court held
that guilty pleas entered prior to the decision in United States v.
Jackson, were not required to be reversed. 196 At the outset of
the opinion by Judge Levine, the New York Court of Appeals
declined to pass upon whether the procedures used in the lower
court violated Hynes v. Tomei reasoning:
Because we agree that, under binding Supreme Court precedent,
defendant's plea was not rendered invalid by Jackson-Hynes, we
need not address whether the specific procedure employed in this
case avoided any Jackson defect, nor whether defendant's waiver
of his right to appeal precluded him from making his constitu19 7
tional claims.
The court went on to reject the defendant's claim that his
plea was not voluntary or knowing because he could not have
anticipated the holding in Hynes v. Tomei. 9 8 The Judge noted
that the precise argument had been made in the Supreme Court
by the appellant in Brady who had pled guilty to the statute
invalidated in Jackson before it had been handed down; pointing out:
The Supreme Court's outright rejection of that contention is directly applicable to the same argument here. "[Aibsent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents, a
voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in light of the applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise."
Accordingly, the "fact that Brady did not anticipate United States
v. Jackson, supra, does not impugn the truth or reliability of his
plea." Here, too, defendant's guilty plea was not rendered invalid
merely because our subsequent Hynes decision may have shown
"that the plea rested on a faulty premise."199
The court further applied the holding in Brady to defeat the
appellant's argument that the Jackson-Hynes holdings made it
impermissible to accept any pleas of guilty where it was the
195.
196.
Jackson,
197.
198.
199.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
People v. Edwards, 754 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 2001) (citing United States v.
390 U.S. 570 (1968)).
Id. at 172.
Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
Edwards, 754 N.E.2d at 173 (citing Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)).
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only means to avoid imposition of a capital sentence. 200 In response to this contention, Judge Levine wrote:
Brady, however, expressly cautioned against the conclusion that a
Jackson defect in the particular death penalty statute necessarily
required invalidation of a guilty plea entered pursuant thereto
that was otherwise valid (i.e., voluntary, knowing and intelligent):
Plainly, it seems to us, Jackson ruled neither that all
pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible
death sentence are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not.
Jackson prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
under [the defective statute], but that decision neither
fashioned a new standard for judging the validity of
guilty pleas nor mandated a new application of the
test theretofore fashioned by courts and since reiterated that guilty pleas are valid if both "voluntary" and
20
"intelligent. '
This opinion produced a dissent from Judge George Bundy
Smith who saw the issues in starkly different terms siding with
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division in its view of
Hynes v. Tomei,202 and also because he believed the acceptance
of the plea violated not only constitutional principles but statutory provisions as well. On these points he wrote:
In Hynes, this Court stated that because the provisions prohibited the imposition of the death penalty only on a plea of guilty
to murder in the first degree, the sections needlessly encouraged
defendants to forego trial in an effort to avoid a death penalty
prosecution. Just as the applicable provisions chilled a defendant's exercise of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in United
States v. Jackson and Hynes v. Tomei, the provisions, already de20 3
clared unconstitutional, chill those rights in this case.

Of even more interest was Judge Smith's view concerning
the validity of the defendant's conviction which was not final
until after the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Hynes v.
Tomei.20 4 Discussing this issue the Judge observed "[o]nce this
Court declared the plea provisions unconstitutional, no judg200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970)).
Hynes v. Tomei, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
Edwards, 754 N.E.2d at 178 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
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ment should have been entered pursuant to a plea of guilty
under those provisions. When an applicable provision of law
changes while a case is still on appeal, the new standard applies
20 5
to that case."
After discussing the New York cases which had also applied
the changes in state law to cases on direct appeal, Judge Smith
turned to his view of the relevance of the Supreme Court holding in Brady to the instant case, noting:
[tihe majority's view that this case is governed by Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 [sic] is
simply incorrect. The Jackson case held the plea provisions of the
kidnaping [sic] statute unconstitutional. It did not invalidate the
entire statute, nor did it prevent pleas under the statute. Here, by
contrast, the very statute authorizing defendant's plea has been
declared unconstitutional. The issue in Brady was whether defendant's plea was voluntary when the reason for the plea was to
avoid the death penalty. Here, voluntariness is not an issue. The
issue is whether the plea is valid when the statutory20provisions
6
under which the plea was made are unconstitutional.
The application of the holding in Brady to the instant case
makes it crystal clear that the New York Court of Appeals is not
about to retrospectively invalidate those pleas taken under the
statute prior to or contemporaneously with the determination
in Hynes,20 7 irrespective of whether they run afoul of the spirit
or the letter of that holding. The dissent in Edwards does however raise an interesting issue concerning the application of
Hynes to that particular case. 208 Judge Smith makes a very cogent and compelling argument concerning the defendant's entitlement to the benefit in the change of the law during the trial
court proceedings. Moreover this argument becomes even more
persuasive when considered in the light of the procedural posture of the case at the time Hynes 20 9 was decided. The situation
in Edwards210 was not one where the law changed while the
case was on direct appeal but one where the law changed be205.
206.
207.
(1999).
208.
209.
210.

Edwards, 754 N.E.2d at 178 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 178-79 (citations omitted).
Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1015
Edwards, 754 N.E.2d at 176.
Id.
Edwards, 754 N.E.2d 169.
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tween plea and sentencing, which is prior to the entry of final
2 11
judgment in the lower court.
While the court's decision in Edwards212 seemed to, once
and for all, put an end to challenges raised under Hynes 2 3 a
more unique variation of the challenge would come to it in Peo2 14
ple v. Mower.
People v. Mower
People v. Mower 21 5 originated in New York State Supreme
Court, Otsego County. 2 16 As the Appellate Division, Third Department decision recounts:
Defendant was indicted on two counts of murder in the first
degree and two counts of murder in the second degree based on
allegations that he intentionally shot and killed his parents on
March 26, 1996 in the family's home in the Town of Richfield, Otsego County.... On October 4, 1996, the last day of the 120-day
period for filing a notice of intent to seek the death penalty and
without such notice having been filed, defendant entered a counseled plea of guilty of one count of murder in the first degree in
satisfaction of the four murder charges, all other pending indictments and uncharged crimes in this State, and charges pending
in Texas. Supreme Court subsequently sentenced defendant to
life imprisonment without parole. Defendant then appealed this
judgment. More than three years later, defendant moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10 and Supreme Court
denied the motion. Defendant's appeal of this denial has now
been consolidated with his 1996 direct appeal. 217
No explanation was set forth in the decision for the threeyear delay in perfecting the defendant's appeal, nor why it was
not perfected prior to the relief being sought under Article 440
of the Criminal Procedure Law. 218 Nevertheless, the defendant
211. Section 1.20(15) of the Criminal Procedure Law defines a "judgment" as
"comprised of a conviction and the sentence imposed thereon and is completed by
imposition and entry of the sentence." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 1.20(15) (McKinney
2003).
212. Edwards, 754 N.E.2d 169.
213. Hynes, 706 N.E.2d 1201.
214. People v. Mower, 765 N.E.2d 839 (N.Y. 2002).
215. Id.
216. People v. Mower, 719 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781 (App. Div. 2001).
217. Id. at 781 (citations omitted).
218. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 440.10 (McKinney 2003).
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raised a number of issues on appeal. Among them were
whether: (1) the decision in Hynes v. Tomei 2 19 had the effect of
invalidating "the statutory authorization for a court to impose a
sentence of life without parole except after conviction by a
jury;"220 (2) the failure to define the terms "same criminal transaction" 221 contained in section 125.27(1)(a)(vii) 222 and "more
224
223
than eighteen years old" in section (1)(b) of the Penal Law
rendered the statutes void for vagueness, and (3) he was entitled to "a heightened due process" 225 analysis during the sentencing phase of his case in the trial court.
In disposing of each of these contentions, the appellate division ruled at the outset of its opinion that the defendant, in re226
lying on the language of section 70.00(5) of the Penal Law,
had "overlooked" the provisions of section 400.27 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 227 Writing for a unanimous bench, Judge
Rose observed:
Although CPL 400.27 sets forth the procedure for a separate
proceeding for the jury to consider the death penalty where a defendant was convicted by a jury and the prosecution had timely
filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, defendant's argument overlooks the provision that "[niothing in this section shall
be deemed to preclude the people at any time from determining
that the death penalty shall not be sought in a particular case, in
which case the separate sentencing proceeding shall not be conducted and the court may sentence such defendant to life imprisonment without parole." As Supreme Court had the statutory
authority to sentence defendant to life imprisonment without parole, and since the prohibition against pleas and plea negotiations
during the pendency of a death penalty notice is not implicated
219. Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
220. Mower, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
221. Id. at 782.
222. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(a)(vii) (McKinney 2003).
223. Id.
224. Id. § l(b).
225. Mower, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
226. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.00(5) (reciting in pertinent part: "A defendant
may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole only upon conviction for the
crime of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of this chapter and
in accordance with the procedures provided by law for imposing a sentence for such
crime").
227. N.Y. CRIM. Poc. LAw § 400.27 (McKinney 2003).
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here because no such notice was filed in this case, we find defen228
dant's argument to be without merit.

Rejecting the defendant's claim that the phrase "same
criminal transaction" was unconstitutionally vague, the court
adopted the view the Appellate Division of the Second Department took on the same challenge in People v. Reed.229

In Reed, a non-capital prosecution for murder in the first
degree, the defendants, on appeal, contended that the phrase
"same criminal transaction" 230 set forth in section 125.27(1)(a)
(viii) of the Penal Law 231 was void for vagueness. 232 There, the
court determined that the definition set forth in section 40.10(2)
of the Criminal Procedure Law233 would suffice. Judge Miller,
the author of the court's opinion, noted that this definition had
been incorporated by reference into a variety of other statutes
as well as defined in numerous other decisions. The Judge went
on to take note of a split in the lower courts concerning the application of this definition to the statute, observing:
[iun People v. Harris, a first degree murder prosecution, the
court applied the definition of criminal transaction provided by
CPL 40.10(2) in considering a multiplicity challenge in a case
against a multiple murderer. The Harriscourt concluded that a
definition pertinent to double jeopardy considerations was applicable, distinguishing People v. Fernandez, where the court expressly declined to apply the definition of criminal transaction as
set forth in CPL 40.10(2) to the multiple killings provision of the
first degree murder statute. In People v.Fernandez,the court defined the term "criminal transaction" pursuant to its "ordinary
meaning" as a process of carrying out a series of criminal activities from beginning to end, reasoning that "[wihen a statute pro228. Mower, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC.LAw § 400.27(1)).
229. Id. (adopting the holding of People v. Reed, 705 N.Y.S.2d 592 (App. Div.
2000)). Reed will be discussed hereinafter in greater detail.
230. Reed, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
231. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(viii) (McKinney 2003).
232. Reed, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
233. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.10(2) (McKinney 2003) (providing that:
'Criminal transaction' means conduct which establishes at least one offense, and which is comprised of two or more or a group of acts either (a)
so closely related and connected in point of time and circumstance of
commission as to constitute a single incident' or (b) so closely related in
criminal purpose or objective as to constitute elements or integral parts
of a single criminal verture).
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vides a definition, and expressly states that the definition is
applicable to a specific article, the definition is inapplicable to
other articles." However, we do not agree with the conclusion of
the court in People v. Fernandez and neither People v. McNamara
nor People v. Neumann, upon which the Fernandez court relied,
stand for the proposition that definitions can never be borrowed
from one criminal statute for application in another. Furthermore, neither case considered this issue in the context of a constitutional challenge to a statute on vagueness grounds. The New
York Court of Appeals evidently determined that under the circumstances of those cases, definition borrowing was inappropriate. No case (other than Fernandez)has ever cited McNamara or
Neumann as authority for any blanket prohibition against borrowing a statutory definition for application in a prosecution
under a different statute, and any such rule would appear to go
against the authorities cited previously which permit the practice
well
so that an undefined term should "be given its 'precise ' "and
234
state.
the
of
jurisprudence
the
in
settled legal meaning
The Judge went on to declare:
[t]he facts of these cases present multiple and nearly simultaneous shootings by the two defendants, clearly acting in concert to
kill two rival drug dealers. Under these facts, there is no genuine
vagueness problem, since Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(viii) unambiguously proscribes multiple killings, which is "specific conduct
easily avoided by the innocent-minded. It should present no difficulty for a citizen [or citizens] to comprehend that he [or they]
must refrain from [multiple killings]."235
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division easily
236
of the
disposed of Mower's challenge to section 125.27(1)(b)
statute in which he contended the phrase "more than eighteen
years old" was unconstitutionally vague, holding:
It is well understood that an individual concludes the "first eighteen years of life" on his or her eighteenth birthday and begins the
"nineteenth year of life" on that day. Accordingly, the statutory
phrase "more than eighteen years old" is not unconstitutionally
vague and includes persons such as defendant, who was 18 years

234. Reed, 705 N.Y.S.2d 592, 600 (citations omitted).
235. Id. at 601.
236. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 400.27 (McKinney 2003) (citations omitted).
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and 11 months old at the time of the events charged in the indict237
ment here.
After rejecting a challenge to the grand jury presentation,
the court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a
"heightened due process" analysis because it was a non-capital
case, relying on People v. Couser.238
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division, addressing only the issues involving the challenge to the sentencing provisions and the validity of his plea
239
under Hynes v. Tomei.
Judge Graffeo, writing for a unanimous bench reviewed the
statutory provisions of sections 60.06240 and 70.00241 of the Penal Law as well as 400.27 of the Criminal Procedure Law 24 2 and
wrote:
We are obligated, of course, to interpret these statutes in a
manner that effectuates the intent of the Legislature. In this
case, we can accomplish this goal without looking beyond the language employed in each of the pertinent provisions. The phrase
"at any time" demonstrates that CPL 400.27(1) applies to cases in
which the People have declined to seek a death sentence, whether
before or after expiration of the 120-day period for filing the CPL
250.40 notice. If the People do not pursue a death sentence, the
sentencing authority that would otherwise be vested in the jury
remains with the trial court (see CPL 400.27[1]), which is specifically authorized to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (see Penal Law §§ 60.06, 70.00[5]).
Like Penal Law §§ 60.06 and 70.00(5), CPL 400.27 applies to a
first degree murder "conviction." Because that term is defined in
CPL 1.20(13) as "the entry of a plea of guilty to, or a verdict of
guilty upon, an accusatory instrument other than a felony complaint, or to one or more counts of such instrument," it is clear
that the authority to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole exists whether a defendant's conviction is by guilty
243
plea or jury verdict.
237. People v. Mower, 719 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782 (App. Div. 2001).
238. Id. at 783 (citing People v. Couser, 730 N.E.2d 953, 955 (N.Y. 2000)).
239. See People v. Mower, 765 N.E.2d 839 (N.Y. 2002); Hynes v. Tomei, 527
U.S. 1015 (1999).
240. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 60.06 (McKinney 2003).
241. Id. § 70.00.
242. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27 (McKinney 2003).
243. Mower, 765 N.E.2d at 843 (citations omitted).
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The New York Court of Appeals went on to address the issue of the defendant's plea. In rejecting this claim, Judge Graffeo noted; "Defendant also contends that his first degree murder
conviction was affected by a mistake of law because he pleaded
guilty pursuant to the statutory provisions later invalidated by
this Court in Hynes and this rendered his negotiated guilty plea
invalid."

244

As noted previously, this particular challenge appears to be
a unique variation of those previously rejected by the New York
Court of Appeals in Edwards,245 but upon examining the procedural posture of this case it is clear why it was raised in this
way. Unlike the situations presented in Hynes v. Tomei 24 6 and
People v. Edwards,247 in the instant case no notice of intent to
seek the death penalty had been filed pursuant to section

250.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 248 Thus, since the defen-

dant was not in jeopardy of being sentenced to death, the issue
of his being coerced into giving up his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights was not implicated. Although he sought to assert it
as a "voluntariness '249 issue in the New York Court of Appeals,
the situation in the trial court was not lost on the court when it
rejected the argument, holding:
[a]lthough defendant couches his argument as a "voluntariness"
challenge, he presents an issue of law founded on a federal constitutional principle established more than a quarter-century ago.
Yet defendant did not raise this alleged constitutional infirmity
sentenced by Supreme Court, and
before he pleaded guilty or was
250
it is therefore unpreserved.
The New York Court of Appeals went on to note that the
defendant abandoned his arguments concerning the issues involving "same criminal transaction," "multiple murder" and
"more than eighteen years old."'25 1

That the court viewed this argument as a matter of "preservation" is an interesting development since this is the first time
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
People v. Edwards, 754 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 2001).
Hynes v. Tomei, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
Edwards, 754 N.E.2d 169.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 250.40 (McKinney 2003).

249. Mower, 765 N.E.2d at 843 (citations omitted).
250. Id. (citations omitted).
251. Id. at 844.
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that it invoked that doctrine despite the fact that the defendant's conviction was not final when he sought to withdraw his
plea under Hynes v. Tomei.252 Nonetheless, it does appear that
relief under Hynes v. Tomei 253 would appear to be unavailing
since the defendant was not in jeopardy of being put to death at
the time his plea was accepted.
People v. Harris
On July 9, 2002, the New York Court of Appeals decided
the first death penalty case to come to it on direct appeal under
the statute. The defendant, Darrel Harris, was convicted of six
counts of murder in the first degree in Supreme Court, Kings
County as the result of multiple killings that took place in a

Brooklyn social club on December 7,

1996.254

The case had been the subject of pre-trial litigation that
was reported in People v. Harris.255 In the trial court, the defendant had challenged the constitutionality of section 270.20(1)(f)
of the Criminal Procedure Law 256 contending:
that permitting pretrial challenges for cause in capital cases precludes formation of a jury which could "properly exercise discretion in determining the appropriate sentence in a capital case"
and compromises defendant's right to a fair and impartial tribunal. Specifically, defendant argues that a jury chosen pursuant to
CPL § 270.20(1)(f) would be likely to convict, that such a jury
would not represent a fair cross-section of the community, and
that questioning jurors prior to a guilt determination concerning
their death penalty views undermines the presumption of
innocence.257
Justice Feldman began her resolution of this claim by first
noting that a state law carries a strong presumption of constitutionality and that "Defendant thus must sustain a heavy burden to overcome this presumption, demonstrating the statute is
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."258
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See id. at 842; Hynes v. Tomei, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
Hynes, 527 U.S. 1015.
People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 709-10 (N.Y. 2002).
People v. Harris, 675 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 270.20(1)(f) (McKinney 2000).
Harris, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
Id. (citing Fenster v. Leary, 229 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1967)).
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After quoting from the statute itself, Justice Feldman went
on to discuss its application, noting:
[t]he statute thus excludes from the venire two classes of jurors, those so irrevocably opposed and those so irrevocably in
favor of the death penalty that they would be unable to follow the
law on sentencing. Defendant's papers characterize the voir dire
as aimed at selecting only 'death qualified' jurors. In fact, as the
prosecution points out, the voir dire process seeks to identify
those jurors who can follow the court's instructions on punishment which would include both life and death qualified jurors.
"The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's views would 'prevent or

substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath.' " This standard
was applied by the Supreme Court both to death qualification and
life qualification jurors and is consistent with CPL
259
§ 270.20(1)(f)."
After discussing the Lockhart holding, in which the United
States Supreme Court validated an Arkansas statute which required the trial court to determine "death qualification" prior to
trial but rejected a challenge to the inclusion of only "death
qualified" jurors, the Judge turned to the defendant's argument
that Lockhart did not apply to section 400.27(2) of the Criminal
26 1
Procedure Law260 and rejected this argument also.

Defendant's contention that Lockhart does not apply to the
recently enacted Capital Offender Law (L. 1995, ch. 1) of this State
is based on a strained reading of CPL 400.27(2). Under that provision a new jury for the sentencing phase of the trial will be impanelled after a conviction "only in extraordinary circumstances
and upon a showing of good cause." (CPL § 400.27(2)). Because
the two conditions are referred to in the conjunctive it is clear that
the Legislature intended to maintain the continuity of the jury
between the guilt and sentencing phases except in the most uncommon and unavoidable circumstances. "It is envisioned that in
most cases, the jurors who sat at the guilt phase of the trial will
remain at the sentencing phase. A juror might be replaced if the
259. Harris, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 741-42 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
417 (1985)) (additional citations omitted).
260. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(2) (McKinney 2003).
261. Harris,675 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
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juror became grossly unqualified for further service, had legally
improper contact during the guilt phase proceedings or was otherwise legally barred from continuing. However, a juror's reluctance
or discomfort with performing the weighty duty of determining
whether the death penalty should be imposed should not be
grounds for replacing that juror with an alternate juror." (New
York State Assembly Codes Committee Memorandum, 1995
262
N.Y.Legis.Ann., at 6). Thus Lockhart is controlling here.
In addition to the foregoing, the defendant raised two issues directed at the constitutionality of section 400.27 of the
Criminal Procedure Law. 263 The first issue raised was a claim
that section 400.27(3)264 was unconstitutional because it did not
allow for a direct challenge to the aggravating factors, and fails
to guarantee individualized sentencing and improperly limited
the accused's right to present mitigating evidence. 265 In rejecting this challenge, Justice Feldman, after citing the provi266
sions of section 400.27(9)(f) of the Criminal Procedure Law,
(the "catch all" provision which allows the presentation of any
relevant mitigating evidence to challenge the existence of the
aggravating factors) went on to observe "Defendant has no constitutional right to relitigate the aggravating factors in order to
267
create a lingering doubt in the jurors' minds."
After reviewing the mitigating factors enumerated in section 400.27(9),268 Justice Feldman went on to discuss the Eighth

Amendment requirements established by the United States Su270
preme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 269 Lowenfield v. Phelps,
Gregg v. Georgia,27 1 and Jurek v. Texas, 272 as they discussed the
need for narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants and
insuring individualized sentencing, and held:
[tihe New York statutory scheme fulfills both of these requirements. Penal Law § 125.27(1) narrows the class of death262. Id.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

People v. Harris, 676 N.Y.S.2d 440, 440 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 400.27(3) (McKinney 2003).
Harris,675 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 400.27(9)(f) (McKinney 2003).
Harris,676 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 400.27(9) (McKinney 2003).
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987).
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976).
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eligible persons by delineating twelve separate aggravating factors, each of which contains a specific aggravating factor which
raises the particular crime above the vast majority of murders.
Only these enumerated aggravators, if proven at trial, are incorporated as established into the sentencing phase. As to the requirement that sentencing be imposed on an individual basis, the
statute provides for a wide range of mitigators, allowing the sentencing jury to consider "any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence of death" (Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604; 98 S.Ct. 2952, 57 L. Ed.2d 973).
Defendant's argument that banning relitigation of the aggravating factors is constitutionally impermissible misinterprets the
role of aggravating factors as articulated by the Supreme Court in
Lowenfield v. Phelps, supra. There the Court upheld Louisiana's
sentencing scheme which provided that an aggravating factor
which duplicated an element of the offense of which the defendant
had been convicted could form the basis of eligibility for a death
sentence determination. In so holding the court said:
Here, the 'narrowing function' was performed by the
jury at the guilt phase... The fact that the sentencing
jury is also required to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance in addition is no part of the constitutionally required narrowing process. . . [The
state statutory] scheme narrows the class of death-eligible murderers and then at the sentencing phase allows for the consideration of mitigating circumstances
and the exercise of discretion. The Constitution requires no more. (Id. at 246, 108 S.Ct. 546)
The sentencing scheme in New York goes beyond the threshold requirement of Lowenfield. New York employs a weighing
system which mandates that the aggravating factor or factors
must substantially out weigh the mitigating evidence before a
27 3
death sentence can be considered.
After noting that the defendant had misinterpreted
Stringer v. Black,2 7 4 Justice Feldman concluded "Defendant's
claim that denying him the right to directly challenge the aggravators deprives him of his right to an individualized sentencing determination is not persuasive. The statute imbues the
273. People v. Harris, 676 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442-43 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (quoting
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 246).
274. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
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jury with considerable discretion to evaluate a broad range of
mitigation evidence and therefore provides individualized
sentencing."

275

The court finally addressed one of the most interesting
challenges made to the sentencing scheme up to that point,
noting:
Defendant also urges that he has a right to cultivate a
residual or lingering doubt in the jurors' minds concerning his
guilt by formally presenting evidence intended to challenge the
aggravating factors. This argument is overreaching.
In Lockhart v. McCree, the Supreme Court recognized that
under statutes where a single jury considers both defendant's
guilt and sentence there exist the "possibility that, in at least
some capital cases, the defendant might benefit at the sentencing
phase of the trial from the jury's residual doubts about the evidence presented at the guilt phase." However, "Lockhart did not
endorse capital sentencing schemes which permit such use of
'residual doubts,' let alone suggest that capital defendants have a
right to demand jury consideration of 'residual doubts' in the sentencing phase."
Residual doubt is of course part of human nature. However,
because it is not a fact about the defendant or the circumstance of
the crime it cannot be considered to be a mitigating circumstance.
It is instead "a lingering uncertainty about facts-a state of mind
that exists somewhere between 'beyond a reasonable doubt' and
'absolute certainty'." Complying with defendant's request that he
be permitted to contest the adequacy of aggravating factors at the
penalty phase would effectively raise the prosecution's burden
from proof beyond a reasonable doubt to proof with absolute certainty. While no court can expunge instinctive human behavior
from the minds of members of a jury there is no constitutional
basis for requiring it to allow defendant276to relitigate the finding of
his guilt to establish a residual doubt.

The defendant also brought a challenge to New York Criminal
Procedure Law section 400.27(ii)(a),2 7 7 contending that it was
vague and standardless, thereby creating a risk of arbitrary and
capricious sentencing. He took particular aim at the second
275. Harris,676 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
276. Id. (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173, 188 (1988)) (additional citations omitted).
277. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 400.27(ii)(a) (McKinney 2003).
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sentence of the paragraph 2 78 claiming that it was unconstitutionally permissive. Once again, Justice Feldman rejected a
challenge to the statute, 279 writing "Defendant's argument is rejected. When viewed conjunctively this statutory provision
meets constitutional standards and appropriately reflects 28a0 sentencing jury's power to exercise considerable discretion.
In conducting its analysis of this particular point, the court
reviewed the Supreme Court decisions McClesky, Lowenfield,
Gregg and Jurek28 l concerning the need to narrow the class of
death eligible defendants and providing for individualized sentencing. The court then went on to observe:
While the Supreme Court has held that such a weighing process may lead directly and mandatorily to the imposition of a
death sentence the conjunctive clause at issue here provides an
additional safeguard for a defendant facing the death penalty.
The requirement that the jury then unanimously determine
whether death is the appropriate sentence affords the jury the opportunity to confront both the morality of a death sentence under
the circumstances of a particular case and to grapple with the isjury to reject its own weighing detersue of mercy. It allows the
28 2
chooses.
so
it
if
mination
Justice Feldman ultimately held:
In sum, the statutory scheme in New York State meets constitutionally required standards. Above and beyond these standards, CPL 400.27(11)(a) empowers the jury to exercise its mercy
function and decline to impose the death penalty even if it has
and mitigating factors that
found after weighing aggravating
283
death would be warranted.
Following the defendant's conviction in the trial court,
these issues as well as a multitude of others were raised on the
278. Id. § 400.27(11)(a) (providing "The jury may not direct imposition of a
sentence of death unless it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the

aggravating factor or factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factor or fac-

tors established, if any, and unanimously determines that the penalty of death
should be imposed." (emphasis added)).
279. Harris,676 N.Y.S.2d 458.
280. Id. at 459.
281. Harris,676 N.Y.S.2d 458.
282. Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
283. Id. (citations omitted).
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direct appeal. 28 4 At the outset of the decision, Judge Wesley and
the court embraced the standard that heightened due process
applied by quoting from People v. Harris,2s5 "We begin with the
recognition that 'death is different.' "286 The Judge then went
on to point out the many different obligations and procedures
mandated by the statute.
The statutory scheme that makes the penalty a possibility imposes many standards and procedures that are different from
other criminal proceedings. For our part, the statute confers a
unique set of appellate responsibilities on this Court (CPL
470.30). In addition to the powers of an intermediate appellate
court (CPL 470.15, 470.20) we are required to review the factual
basis for the conviction and the sentence (see CPL 470.30[1], [2]:
NY Const, art VI, § 3[a]). We are also directed to examine
whether the death sentence was imposed "under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary or legally impermissible
factor including whether the imposition of the verdict or sentence
was based upon the race of the defendant or a victim of the crime
for which the defendant was convicted" (CPL 470.30[3] [a]). We
must determine whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases (CPL
470.30 [3] [b]) and whether the decision to impose the sentence of
death was against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.30[31[c]).
By its very nature a capital case requires the most meticulous and
thoughtful attention. A mistake discovered years later may not be
2
correctable. 87

The first issue raised by the appellant and addressed by the
court was a challenge to the constitutionality of New York Penal Law section 125.27(1)(a)(vii) 28 8 the felony-murder provision
of murder in the first degree. In framing the issue posed by the
appellant, Judge Wesley wrote:
According to defendant, the felony-murder provision irrationally
includes some felonies rendering them death-eligible while excluding others.

284. Judge Wesley noted in the court's opinion that "Defendant has briefed
over 28 issues and over 60 sub-issues seeking reversal of his conviction, vacatur of
his sentence and other relief." People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 711 (N.Y. 2002).
285. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972).
286. Harris,779 N.E.2d at 711 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 306).
287. Harris,779 N.E.2d at 711-12 (emphasis added).
288. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) (McKinney 2003).
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Defendant contends that the statute fails to include a capital
sentence for murders committed in the course of and in furtherance of many felonies that the Legislature has classified as among
the state's most serious crimes. Defendant submits that the classification of felony murder is not only underinclusive in that
in
equally serious crimes are treated unequally but it is perverse
289
treating lesser crimes more harshly than serious ones.

This precise argument had been raised and rejected in People v.
Hale,290 in which Justice Tomei cited Zant v. Stephens, 29 1 and
Gregg v. Georgia,292 in reaching the conclusion that:
It is not for the courts to second-guess the legislature's determination of which factors set apart certain killings as particularly atrocious, so long as that determination limits the application of the
death penalty to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder,
and the definitions of the aggravating factors are not unconstitutionally vague. See Tuilaepa v. California,512 U.S. 967, 972, 114

S.Ct. 2630, 2635, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994).
Upon reviewing P.L. § 125.27, the court concludes that the
statute passes constitutional muster. The statute limits death
penalty eligibility to a subclass of murders. None of the aggravators is unconstitutionally vague. In particular, the aggravating factors with which the defendant is charged-robbery and
kidnapping in the first degree-are quite clear.
Furthermore, the court cannot say that in defining the felony
aggravating factors, the legislature acted irrationally in choosing
some felonies and exempting others. All of the felony crimes included by the legislature as aggravating factors are crimes involving violence or potential violence, and substantial risk of physical
injury. The defendant's argument that some felonies of a lesser
class are included while others of a greater class are left out
293
misses the point.
Citing Hale, the court adopted Justice Tomei's reasoning and
went on to hold:
The Legislature made the assessment that the predicate felonies
for first-degree felony murder should be those that are potentially
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Harris, 779 N.E.2d at 713 (citations omitted).
People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 466 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).
Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
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the most violent and involve a substantial risk of physical injury.
The Legislature's decision to exclude felonies of a similar grade,
but lacking the inherent potential
for violence and physical in294
jury, was therefore rational.
The court next considered the challenge to the constitutionality of New York Criminal Procedure Law section
270.10(1)(f) 295 which had been raised in the trial court. At the

outset of this portion of the court's decision, Judge Wesley declared that "defendant has failed to overcome the presumption
296
of constitutionality with respect to CPL 270.20(1)(f)."

Unlike the position in the court below, where the defendant
maintained that Lockhart v. McCree297 did not apply to the statute, here he maintained that the court should strike down the
section under the state's constitution. The court, however, declined to do so, holding:
Defendant concedes that Lockhart informs our inquiry here.
Nevertheless, he maintains that independent state constitutional
treatment of the issue requires a contrary result. He suggests
that pretrial death qualification nullifies our state's historic commitment to diversity and nondiscriminatory jury-selection procedures. He also contends that this Court has regularly recognized
the significance of a defendant's right to an impartial jury and
argues that pretrial death qualification undermines this right because the process conditions jurors toward a guilty verdict by requiring them to assume defendant's guilt prior to trial. Moreover,
he relies on studies that purport to show that the surviving jury is
more conviction-prone, possesses pro-prosecution attitudes and is
thus poisoned by the process.
Defendant's challenge is really no different than that made in
Lockhart. At least one New York court has rejected similar claims
by another capital defendant. 298 Nothing in the language of the
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Harris,779 N.E.2d at 713-14.
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 270.10(l)(f) (McKinney 2003).
Harris,779 N.E.2d at 714 (citation omitted).
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
In People v. Hale, Justice Tomei went so far as to hold that:

[E]ven if death qualification resulted in the disproportionate exclusion of
constitutionally cognizable groups such as women and African Americans,
the motion must still be denied. If a violation of the fair cross-section requirement is established, the state may show a "significant state interest"
which must "be manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the
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state's constitutional counterpart of the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial (N.Y. Const., art. I § 2) or our jurisprudence suggests that defendant is entitled to greater protection here on state
constitutional grounds. Defendant also overlooks New York's history of ensuring that juries are death qualified. Thus, we see no
299
state constitutional impediment to CPL 270.20(1)(f).

The court went on to validate the use of group voir dire,
rejecting the Defendant's claim that N.Y. Criminal Procedure
Law section 270.10(1)300 only permitted individual voir dire,
holding:
CPL 270.16(1) directs that the court permit the parties on motion
"to examine the prospective jurors individually and outside the
presence of the other prospective jurors regarding their qualifications to serve as jurors." CPL 270.15(1)(c) states that the court
shall permit both parties to examine the prospective jurors "individually or collectively" regarding their qualifications to serve as
jurors. There is nothing to suggest that in adding CPL 270.16,
the Legislature intended to supersede CPL 270.15.301

Moreover, the court expressly determined that the word "preclude" contained in New York Criminal Procedure Law section
270.20(1)(f) 30 2 is no different than "prevent or substantially impair" enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 30 3 in measuring whether a juror's feeling or
views about the penalty disqualify them from serving. Rejecting the defendant's claim that "preclude" sets a higher
threshold for excusal, the court first noted that the section "expressly mandates that a single standard be used to challenge
jury-selection process, such an exemption criteria, that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a single group." Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,

367-368, 99 S.Ct. 664, 670, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).
This test is satisfied here. "Exclusion of jurors based on their ability to perform
their duties and carry out their oaths advances an important goal, and does not
discriminate on the basis of membership in a cognizable group, per se." Hale, 661
N.Y.S.2d at 486.
299. Harris,779 N.E.2d at 715-16 (citations omitted).
300. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 270.10(1) (McKinney 2000).
301. Harris,779 N.E.2d at 717 (citations omitted). The issue in People v. Santiago was even more novel. There, the court rejected a claim that section 270.16
authorized "examination of prospective jurors to be done solely by counsel without
participation by the court." People v. Santiago, 708 N.Y.S.2d 269, 269 (County Ct.
2000).
302. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(f) (McKinney 2000).
303. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
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prospective jurors who entertain 'such conscientious opinions ei30 4
ther against or in favor of capital punishment."
It then continued:
We understand the word "preclude" to relate to the ability of a
prospective juror to perform his or her duty to act impartially and
to follow a court's instructions in accordance with the law and not
as a measurement of the strength or sincerity of an individual's
feelings on the death penalty. As the Supreme Court cases tell us,
the focus is on the jurors' ability to serve impartially and not on
how the death penalty affects them generally. Thus, the word
"preclude" must be understood as an embodiment of the Wain30 5
wright "prevent or substantially impair" standard.
Among other issues addressed was the trial court's refusal
to allow the defendant to call an expert witness in rebuttal on
the issue of extreme emotional disturbance, which had been
raised as an affirmative defense. While ruling that the trial
judge had been technically correct, the court cautioned, "[t]his
was a lengthy trial in which two experts testified extensively
about defendant's mental and emotional state. We are careful
to note, however, that capital trial courts should exercise great
caution in making discretionary determinations such as this.
30 6
The stakes are high for all involved."
The New York Court of Appeals also disposed of two additional errors under the "harmless error" rule. 30 7 The first in-

volved testimony of several of the homicide victims' family
members who were purportedly called to identify the deceased
but whose testimony went beyond this subject and into their
background. In passing upon this issue, Judge Wesley wrote:
The admission of this type of evidence is problematic. We have
long held that testimony about victims' personal backgrounds
that is immaterial to any issue at trial should be excluded. The
testimony here is indistinguishable from that in Miller and
Caruso. Although family information about a victim is an important aspect of the victim's life, generally, it has no bearing on the
defendant's guilt or innocence. We are not unmindful of a prosecutor's desire to convey to the jury the seriousness of the loss of a
304.
305.
(1980)).
306.
307.

Harris,779 N.E.2d at 719 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. (citing Wainwright, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38
Harris, 779 N.E.2d at 723.
People v. Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d 787, 791 (N.Y. 1975).
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life. However, our case law is clear that testimony of this type
30 8
should not be used for that purpose.
The other issue that was treated in this fashion was the
prosecution's eliciting testimony from two witnesses that the
defendant "smiled" and "smirked" at them during their appearances on the stand and commenting on it during summation. 30 9
Again, the court cautioned:
We have recognized that admitting evidence of a smile as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt is error. "A smile
...can convey many different states of mind-for example, relief,
bewilderment, nervousness, exasperation or happiness." Though
not reversible error here, this type of evidence is of questionable
and limited probative value; we caution against its admission. 310
Ultimately the court struck down the death sentence that
had been imposed because the defendant had been convicted
under the statutory scheme that had been invalidated in Hynes
v. Tomei. 311 In doing so, the court declined to retreat from its
holding in that case, writing:
The People and the Attorney General urge us to review Hynes
and "modify" our holding to restore the sections we declared unconstitutional. Neither offers a new argument for a different result. Both acknowledge that if Hynes remains the law,
defendant's death sentence must be vacated. All seven of us have
concluded that there is no reason to retreat from Hynes; all of us
agree that the statute at the time of the defendant's trial impermissibly discouraged defendant's assertion of his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. Accordingly, the trial court could not constitutionally impose the sentence of death on this defendant. The
appropriate remedy is to vacate his death sentence and to remit
his case to Supreme Court pursuant to CPL 470.30(5)(c) for resentencing in accordance with Penal Law §§ 60.06 and 70.00(5). In
light of that determination, we decline to comment on the propriety of the sentencing proceedings at this juncture. 3 12
308. Harris, 779 N.E.2d at 724 (citing People v. Miller, 160 N.E.2d 74 (N.Y.
1959); People v. Caruso, 159 N.E. 390 (N.Y. 1927)).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 725. (quoting People v. Basora, 556 N.E.2d 1070, 1071 (N.Y. 1990)
(additional citations omitted)).
311. Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
312. Harris, 779 N.E.2d at 728.
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Having modified the defendant's sentence, the court was
unwilling to go any further and either reverse the conviction or
entertain a challenge to the death penalty under the state constitution, holding:
Finally, defendant urges that we address the issue whether
the entire death penalty scheme is unconstitutional pursuant to
the State Constitution's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
(N.Y. Const., art. I, § 5). The People claim that defendant's inability to demonstrate any as-applied harm necessarily precludes him
from bringing a facial challenge. Defendant, on the other hand,
relies on various Supreme Court cases including Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 and notes that the
Supreme Court examined facial claims irrespective of the defendants' lack of an as-applied challenge.
Despite the success of defendant's Jackson challenge to his
sentence, his conviction remains. Defendant's situation is distinguishable from the petitioners in Gregg, Profitt and Jurek, who
were not sentenced under Jackson-violative statutory schemes
and were facing the death penalty. Because the disposition of this
constitutional issue is313not necessary to this appeal, we need not
decide it at this time.
Judge Smith concurred in part and dissented in part.
While he agreed with the court that the sentence had to be vacated pursuant to Hynes v. Tomei, 314 he would have reversed
the defendant's conviction based upon the trial court's refusal to
apply heightened scrutiny to all issues affecting sentencing, the
refusal to permit the defendant's expert rebuttal testimony, and
the failure to grant the defendant a challenge for cause with
315
respect to a prospective juror.
313. Id. (citations omitted). In footnote 23 to this portion of the decision, the
court noted:
[w] e need not reach the defendant's contention that New York's capital punishment statute permits the district attorneys to select capital defendants
arbitrarily, inconsistently and discriminatorily. [Criminal Procedure Law]
section 250.40 authorizes the prosecutor to seek death as a sentence. Because the sentence is vacated, there is no need to address the viability of the
statute at this time.
Id. n.23.
314. Hynes, 706 N.E.2d 1201.
315. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705.
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The decision in People v. Harris3 16 contains a number of interesting features worthy of comment. Paramount among
these, of course, is the court's unanimous determination not to
retreat from its holding in Hynes v. Tomei. 317
At the outset of discussing the other aspects of the decision,
it is noteworthy that the New York Court of Appeals has determined that it will utilize "heightened due process" scrutiny in
its analysis to those death penalty cases that come before it.
Notwithstanding that more exacting scrutiny, the court is not
reluctant to apply the "harmless error" doctrine as it did in its
analysis of the evidentiary issues involving the testimony of the
expert rebuttal witness, while at the same time cautioning "that
capital trial courts should exercise great caution in making discretionary determinations" 318 because "the stakes are high for
all involved." 319 Indeed in this case the court applied the rule
not only to claims of prosecutorial misconduct (whether the defendant's "smile" or "smirk" was consciousness of guilt), but also
to "victim-survivor" testimony as well the limitation of the defendant's rebuttal case previously mentioned.
In deciding the issue of the permissibility of the "victimsurvivor" testimony, the court also departed from the standard
allowed by the United States Supreme Court and applied the
more limited rule utilized in New York.
Prior to 1991, the Supreme Court had banned the use of
victim impact testimony as a consideration during the sentencing phase of a capital case. 320 In 1991, the Court revisited this
issue in Payne v. Tennessee,321 holding:
We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude
that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the
defendant. "[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting
the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in,
by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be
316. See generally id.

317. Id.
318.
319.
320.
490 U.S.
321.

Id. at 723.
Id.
See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); South Carolina v. Gathers,
805 (1989).
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual
whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular
to his family." By turning the victim into a "faceless stranger at
the penalty phase of a capital trial," Gathers, 490 U.S., at 821, 109
S.Ct. at 2216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), Booth deprives the State
of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury
to determine
from having before it all the information necessary
322
the proper punishment for a first-degree murder.
To be sure, the issue before the New York Court of Appeals
was different than that posed in Payne. In Harris,the evidence
about the victims offered through the survivors was being offered on the issue of the identification of the victims and not as
an "aggravating" factor or in rebuttal to "mitigating" evidence
in the penalty phase of the proceedings. Thus treatment of it
under the "harmless error" rule may well have been the appropriate determination, particularly in light of the voiding of the
defendant's sentence. Nonetheless, the court might have found
the evidence to be both relevant and permissible under Payne,
given its professed adherence to Supreme Court precedent that
3 23
it has repeatedly expressed in the past.
Finally, by voiding the defendant's death sentence under
Hynes v. Tomei,324 the court was not required to engage in the
proportionality review or otherwise pass upon any issues raised
in the sentencing proceeding. Trial courts will have to wait for
future cases to arrive on the court's docket to get any guidance
from the State's highest court concerning the provisions of section 400.27 of the Criminal Procedure Law. The same is true of
any challenge to the death penalty under article 1, section 5 of
325
the New York State Constitution.

322. Id. at 825 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting)).
323. See, e.g., People v. Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d 139 (N.Y. 1973); People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1977); Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
324. Hynes, 706 N.E.2d 1201.
325. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 95. This provision entitled "Bail; fines; punishments; detention of witnesses," reads as follows; "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained."
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Lower Court Decisions
As noted earlier, the Appellate Division of the Second Department in People v. Reed, 326 in a non-capital prosecution, rejected a challenge to the phrase "same criminal transaction" set
forth in section 125.27(1)(a)(viii) of the Penal Law. That, however, was not the only issue addressed by the court in Reed.
There, the defendant additionally claimed that a conviction for
multiple murders pursuant to section 125.27(1)(a)(viii) of the
Penal Law could not be predicated on accessorial liability because the statute expressly referred only to the "actor." Preliminarily to rejecting this challenge, the court declined to impose
"heightened due process" scrutiny to the claim because the defendants were not being subjected to capital punishment. The
court then went on to note that section 35 of the General Construction Law expressly authorized words utilized in the singular to also be treated in the plural. It next pointed out that
numerous cases had held that one could be liable for murder in
the second degree in violation of section 125.25 of the Penal Law
as an accessory, despite the fact that the statute also speaks to
the actor in the singular. 327 Judge Miller then addressed the
appellants' arguments concerning these issues in the context of
the murder in the first degree statute:
The defendants argue that had the Legislature intended multiple killers to be convicted of first degree murder via accessorial
liability, it would have expressly done so. To support this proposition the defendants note that the Legislature created special rules
of accessorial liability in the first degree felony murder and contract killing provisions. The defendants posit that the Legislature
could have also expressly created special rules for accessorial liability in the multiple killers provision. However, the defendants'
arguments clearly miss the mark and run contrary to established
canons of statutory construction.
A defendant can be convicted of second degree felony murder
as an accessory for participating in a designated felony (see, Penal
326. People v. Reed, 705 N.Y.S.2d 592 (App. Div. 2000).
327. See, e.g., People v. Ficarrota, 691 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1997); People v. Allah, 522 N.E.2d 1029 (N.Y. 1988); People v. Whatley, 505 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1987);
People v. Brathwaite, 472 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1984); People v. Ortega, 685 N.Y.S.2d
446 (App. Div. 1999); People v. Woodbourne, 656 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. Div. 1997);
People v. Adams, 586 N.Y.S.2d 298 (App. Div. 1992); People v. Gonzalez, 532
N.Y.S.2d 934 (App. Div. 1988); Reed, 705 N.Y.S.2d 592.
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Law § 125.25[21) with the requisite intent to commit the underlying felony and the knowledge that death could result. In sharp
contrast, the Legislature expressly limited accessorial liability in
first degree felony murder cases so that a non-shooter can be convicted of first degree felony murder only if, during the perpetration of a designated felony, the non-shooter expressly
"commanded" the shooter to kill. Contrary to the defendants' sophistic contentions, the fact that the Legislature created separate
rules for first degree felony murder limiting accessorial liability
gives rise to the inference that the Legislature did not intend to
limit normal rules of accessorial liability in the multiple killings
3 28
paragraph of the first degree murder statute.
The court cited Judge Donnino's PracticeCommentary concerning section 125.27 of the Penal Law which expressly stated
that this limitation on accessorial liability applied to this provision alone. 329 After citing several other sections governing statutory construction, 330 the court honed in on the legislation itself
and the accompanying memoranda noting:
The Legislative Bill Jacket accompanying the enactment of
the first degree murder statute contains no express discussion of
accessorial liability for accomplice killers. However, in Governor
Pataki's approval memorandum, he pointed out that a defendant's "extent of participation in the murder" is a mitigating factor that a jury can consider in the sentencing phase of the case
(Governor's Mem approving L. 1995, ch. 1, 1995 N.Y. Legis. Ann.,
at 2). In furtherance thereof, the statutorily-mandated mitigating
factors which a jury must consider include that "[t]he defendant
was criminally liable for the present offense of murder committed
by another but his participation in the offense was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution" (CPL 400.27[9] [d] [emphasis added]). This eliminates any
doubt that the Legislature intended to permit first degree murder
prosecutions to be brought against accessorially-liable defendants, leaving their degree of participation for the determination of
the sentencing jury. As such, the defendants' arguments that an
accessory may not be convicted of first degree murder for multiple
331
killings are clearly wrong.
328. Reed, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (citations omitted).
329. William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, N.Y.
(McKinney 2003).
330. N.Y. STAT. LAW §§ 74, 240 (McKinney 2000).
331. Reed, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 597-98.
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The Reed court additionally rejected this claim on constitutional grounds brought under Furman v. Georgia.3 32 The court
also cited Enmund v. Floridaand Tison v. Arizona, in which the
Supreme Court held that a defendant could be executed where
the liability for murder was accessorial depending on the degree
333
of participation in the crime.

When one considers the New York Court of Appeals ultimate affirmance in People v. Couser, and its reliance on Supreme Court precedent in the area of capital jurisprudence, it
appears to be highly unlikely that any aspect of this decision
334
would have been disturbed on appeal.
In the almost seven years since the death penalty has been
re-instituted, the various trial courts throughout the State have
grappled with a wide variety of issues.
335
One of the earliest decisions came in People v. Rodriguez,
in which the court rejected a claim that "heightened due process" was required at the grand jury stage. There, Justice Altman observed:
At the core of many arguments presented by defendants is
their oft repeated thesis that those who are charged with capital
offenses are deserving of "heightened due process" at every stage
of the proceeding against them. This premise finds no support in
either federal or state case law. The Supreme Court has recognized no more than that "the qualitative difference of death from
all punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of
scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination ....

the Court's

principal concern has been more with the procedure by which the
State imposes the death sentence... once it has been determined
that the defendant falls within the category of persons eligible for
the death penalty" (California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-999,
103 S.Ct. 3446, 3452, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (underscore added)).
Stricter scrutiny of a capital case is, thus, limited to the penalty phase of the proceeding. Additionally, nowhere has this
greater scrutiny been equated with "heightened due process."
The concept is also alien to the case law of this jurisdiction, however much defendants would have it otherwise. Defendants are
332. Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
333. Reed, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)).
334. See People v. Couser, 730 N.E.2d 953 (N.Y. 2000).
335. People v. Rodriguez, 647 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
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incorrect in arguing that People v. Johnson, 69 N.Y.2d 339, 514
N.Y.S.2d 324, 506 N.E.2d 1177 stands for the proposition that a
defendant facing the death penalty is deserving of other than "ordinary" due process. That is not to say that these defendants do
not enjoy every constitutional protection, only that there are no
due process protections peculiar to them which are unavailable to
others. The Constitution does not require that they be exempted
from any provision of the Criminal Procedure Law so long as it
otherwise complies with due process, merely because they may ultimately be found to be subject to the death penalty. 336
This reasoning was embraced by the trial court in People v.
Chinn,337 decided in County Court, Onondaga County. In
Chinn, Judge Mulroy may have made the first trial court determination that the New York death penalty statute did not run
afoul of the Eighth Amendment relying on Gregg v. Georgia, as
well as passing upon the plea provisions which were later inval338
idated in Hynes v. Tomei.
The defendant argues that the provisions of the death penalty
statute which prohibit a defendant from entering a plea of guilty
to the crime of Murder in the First Degree except with the consent
of the People and the permission of the Court are unconstitutional. The defendant argues that this provision violates due process and equal protection because the classification of capital
defendants results in different treatment. The defendant has,
however, argued throughout his papers that capital defendants
are in fact a special classification entitled to different treatment
in other contexts due to the nature of the charges against them.
It is clear that the basis of the prohibition against a plea of
guilty in a capital case is to ensure that defendants in capital
cases are not deprived of their fundamental right to a jury trial.
Based on the extensive appellate review of capital cases, the State
also has an interest in ensuring that a full record of all facts and
circumstances leading to the imposition of a sentence of death are
part of the record which will be reviewed. A jury trial is the most
effective way to ensure that the facts of the case are fully litigated
and that a complete record is established.
In any event, this Court wholly rejects the defendant's arguments that he is entitled to plead guilty as charged. Again, only
336.
337.
Nov. 19,
338.

Id. at 352 (emphasis omitted).
People v. Chinn, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1996, at 31, col. 3 (N.Y. County Ct.
1996).
Id. (relying on Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
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the right to a jury trial in a criminal case is a fundamental right.
The statutory scheme in New York State requires a jury trial with
proof of the aggravating factors supporting the charge of Murder
in the First Degree and, as the statutory scheme does not affect
any fundamental right, and is rationally related to the State's interest in assuring that full disclosure of the facts in capital cases
is had, and that no capital defendant enters an improvident plea
of guilty, there is no basis for this Court to declare those provisions unconstitutional. Nor does this Court find that the restrictions imposed by these sections of the Criminal Procedure Law
limit, as defendant argues, the defendant's ability to present mitigating evidence. As such, the defendant's motion in regard to the
339
plea limitations is DENIED.
The issue of "heightened due process" next arose in People
v. Prater,in which Justice Feldman ruled that it did not require
application to the selection of grand jurors or to the discovery
statutes. 34 0 Justice Feldman noted that "heightened due process ... was used by the Supreme Court only with reference to
the verdict or sentencing aspects of a capital." 34 1 Notwithstanding this observation, Justice Feldman, recognizing the gravity
of a potential death penalty prosecution, imposed an additional
burden on the prosecution during the grand jury phase of the
case, writing:
The court does however believe than in one respect the district attorney's discretion in presenting a potential death penalty
case to the grand jury should be circumscribed. The Capital Offender's Law is unique not only because it carries with it the potential of death but also because of the unprecedented power it
places in the district attorney's office. The statute provides that
once the Grand Jury returns an indictment of murder in the first
degree the only permissible sentences are death, life without parole, or incarceration for a minimum period of 20 to 25 years and a
maximum of life. Should a defendant wish to plead guilty in a
case where the prosecution is seeking the death penalty the court
may accept the plea and impose a lesser sentence only with the
consent of the district attorney who also would appear to have
ultimate control over the sentence even if the death penalty is not
being sought.
339. Chinn, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1996, at 31, col. 3.

340. People v. Prater, 648 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
341. Id. at 230 (citations omitted).
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By comparison, where the highest charge in an indictment is
murder in the second degree, not only is the range of authorized
sentences far greater (PL § 70.00(2)(a) and (3)(a)(i)) but the trial
judge may accept a guilty plea and impose sentence over the prosecution's objection.
In view of these stringent statutorily imposed plea bargaining limitations and in the interest of avoiding an unnecessary
prosecution for murder in the first degree, a departure from existing law governing a Grand Jury presentation is warranted in
one respect. Where a defendant offers evidence of "[an] extreme
emotional disturbance for which there [is] a reasonable explanation or [cause]" the Grand Jury should be instructed as to the impact of such evidence (PL § 125.27(2)(a)). Thus the Grand Jury
should be made aware that extreme emotional disturbance constitutes an affirmative defense which precludes a charge of murder
in the first degree (PL § 125.27(2)(a)).
Notwithstanding the decisions in People v. Lancaster, supra,
and People v. Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 36, 476 N.Y.S.2d 50, 464 N.E.2d
418, where the Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was not
required to instruct a Grand Jury concerning affirmative defenses
which would not completely preclude prosecution, this court be342
lieves such an instruction should be given here.
It is hard to see how directing the district attorney to go
beyond the holdings in Lancaster and Valles, solely because of
the special considerations involved in the plea bargaining restrictions in a death eligible case, is anything other than
"heightened due process" despite the disclaimer that it is inapplicable except in the penalty phase of the case.
Among the many issues that confronted trial courts once
the statutory scheme was effective, was what factors a sentencing court should weigh when a defendant is convicted of murder
in the first degree but a non-capital sentence is being sought.
In People v. Bell, Judge Donalty decided to conduct a hearing
similar to that authorized under section 400.27 of the Criminal
Procedure Law in which each side could provide information
concerning aggravating and mitigating factors. 34 3 While acknowledging that no hearing was required and that the section
recites it shall not be held when the death penalty is not to be
imposed, the Judge, nevertheless, reasoned "[g]iven the gravity
342. Id. at 230-31.
343. People v. Bell, 656 N.Y.S.2d 162 (County Ct. 1997).
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of that decision (particularly in light of the age of this defendant) this court determined that a hearing consistent with one
required pursuant to CPL 400.27 would be prudent, and in the
34 4
exercise of its discretion, order the same."
In contrast, Justice Alan Marrus expressly took issue with
this procedure in People v. Johnson, observing:
With all due deference to the Oneida County Court judge who
ordered this special hearing, this court is of the view that such a
hearing is not authorized by the statute and is not necessary for
the court to carry out its sentencing function in a fair and
34 5
thoughtful manner.
The issue of "heightened due process" was again raised in
People v. Shulman.346 In that case the defendant was charged
under the "serial killer" provision of section 125.27(10)(a)(xi) of
the Penal Law.3 47 The defendant challenged this portion of the
statute contending that it violated the prohibition against ex
post facto laws in the United States Constitution because two of
the killings that comprised part of this charge were committed
before the effective date of the statute. In rejecting this challenge Judge Pitts held:
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the
ex post facto clause prohibits any penal statute which (1) punishes
as a crime an act previously committed which was innocent when
done, (2) makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its commission, or (3) deprives one charged with a crime a defense which was available by law at the time the act was
committed. Excluded by definition, therefore, are those statutes
which permit the enhancement of punishment for a present crime
based upon a prior crime, even where the prior crime occurred
34 8
before enactment of the penalty enhancing statute.
After discussing the various decisions concerning this issue
in other states, Judge Pitts concluded:
344. Id. at 163.
345. People v. Johnson, 655 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
346. People v. Shulman, 658 N.Y.S.2d 794 (County Ct. 1997).
347. Id. at 794.
348. Id. at 797 (citations omitted). An identical result, adopting this rationale, was reached by Judge Connell in People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981, 991-92
(County Ct. 1997).
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Under clause (xi) of Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a), a defendant cannot
be deemed to have committed murder in the first degree until after he or she commits the third killing. "A statute is not retroactive . . . when made to apply to future transactions, merely
because such transactions relate to and are founded upon antece349
dent events."
Rejecting the defendant's claim that because his case was
potentially a capital one, "heightened due process" should apply, the court noted "[a]s this court and [many] others have concluded, however, capital cases do not require an "enhanced"
level of due process."350
In People v. McIntosh, which arose in Dutchess County
Court, the defendant brought a variety of challenges to the statutory scheme. 351 In its initial decision the court addressed a
challenge to section 270.20(1)(f) of the Criminal Procedure Law
in which the defendant sought to have the statutory language
(which provided for a challenge for cause to a juror whose views
about the death penalty would preclude them from rendering
an impartial verdict), expanded to recite "preclude or substantially impair." Citing Wainwright v. Witt, Judge Marlow
observed:
[T]he court held that "the proper standard for determining when a
prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views
on capital punishment is whether the juror's views would 'prevent
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath."' While the federal
disqualification standard is broader, the language of the New
York Statute is essentially consistent with that upheld by the Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, supra, and indeed the New
York Statute renders it more difficult for prosecutors to excuse for
cause potential jurors who have reservations against applying the
death penalty. As noted, such jurors could not be excused unless
their views "precluded" adherence to the law and thus this court
finds that such a standard passes scrutiny under both the federal
and state constitutions. However, to the extent that the statutory
language may be construed to deny a defendant's challenge for
cause to a prospective juror whose views in favor of the death pen349. Shulman, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (citations omitted).
350. Id. (citing People v. Rodriguez, 647 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1996)).
351. People v. McIntosh, 662 N.Y.S.2d 212 (County Ct. 1997) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985)).
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alty might substantially impair his or her ability to perform as a
juror in accordance with law, the court would, of course, be constrained to determine such a challenge based upon the prevailing
constitutional standard to insure defendant's right to be tried by a
fair and impartial jury, i.e., "jurors who will conscientiously apply
the law and find the facts".
The Adams Court recognized the limitations on the state's
power to exclude jurors on grounds broader than those permitted
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed in
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d
776.
While New York can clearly afford greater protection to a defendant than is required by Federal law, it cannot give less.
Therefore, in accordance with the prevailing constitutional
standards, this court will grant valid defense challenges for cause
when advanced against those prospective jurors whose views in
favor of the death penalty would preclude or substantially impair
those jurors' ability to perform as a juror in accordance with
35 2
law.
In a later decision in the same case, Judge Marlow addressed a challenge brought against the plea provisions of the
statute identical to that made in People v. Hale and People v.
Chinn, and ultimately decided in Hynes v. Tomei. 353 In rejecting this challenge, Judge Marlow distinguished the plea provisions adopted by New York from those involved in United
States v. Jackson,354 finding that the requirement that a plea be
entered only with the approval of the court and the consent of
the District Attorney as one which safeguarded the rights of all
parties, including society, writing:
By adopting this safeguard for the People through their
elected district attorney to insure that a jury will decide in certain
selected cases whether a death sentence is warranted-rather
than allowing a defendant to make that decision unilaterally as
was the case in Jackson, under the Federal Kidnapping Act-the
352. McIntosh, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 213-14 (citations omitted).
353. People v. McIntosh, 662 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (County Ct. 1997); see People
v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1997); People v. Chinn, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19,
1996, at 31, col. 3 (N.Y. County Ct. Nov. 19, 1996); Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d

1201 (N.Y. 1998).
354. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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state has established a way of protecting its policy of controlling
when the death penalty may, and when it may not, be imposed.
In mandating this procedure, New York has eliminated the
needless encouragement of a defendant's waiver of his/her Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights-i.e., the infirmity which was
targeted and condemned by the Supreme Court in Jackson. Now,
in New York, in order to avoid the death penalty, a defendant
must strike an agreement with the People (with the court's approval), a process which New York believes is necessary to assure
that certain especially heinous crimes will be considered for death
35 5
penalty treatment.
Four months later, in People v. Shulman, Judge Pitts citing
both People v. Hale and People v. McIntosh, sided with Judge
Marlow holding that the plea restrictions embodied in Criminal
Procedure Law sections 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(b)(vii) and
220.60(2), did not violate the defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights by coercing a plea of guilty. 356 In agreeing
with Judge Marlow, Judge Pitts wrote:
This court is in agreement with Judge Marlowe [sic]. While
defendant notes that a plea of guilty remains the only sure way of
avoiding a potential sentence of death, defendant merely argues
that a plea of guilty may be a favorable option. However, the
Court in Jackson did not hold that plea provisions must exclude
all incentive to plead guilty. That a plea bargain results from a
desire to limit ones sentence does not render it involuntary.
Moreover, "a State may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits, notwithstanding the fact that every such instance is bound to have the concomitant effect of discouraging a
defendant's assertion of his trial rights." The "evil" in the Kidnaping Act, was rather the "needless encouragement" of waiving such
rights.
Viewed in that light, it becomes apparent that the accused's
unilateral right to yield to overwhelming temptation, plead guilty
and thereby escape all possibility of death was the element upon
which the Jackson decision was hinged. While, in New York, the
incentive to plead might remain, the absolute right to do so does
not. In Jackson, it was, in fact, suggested that limiting defen355. McIntosh, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
356. Shulman, 658 N.Y.S.2d 794 (citing People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); McIntosh, 662 N.Y.S.2d 212).
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dant's right to avoid death would remedy the constitutional

defect.

....357

The New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County denied
358
the defendant's motion.
In People v. Gordon, Justice Demakos adopted the reasoning in People v. Hale, and People v. Chinn that "heightened due
process" was not required at every phase of a potential capital
prosecution. 359 In rejecting this standard of scrutiny, the Judge
made the interesting observation that "[t]o assume that a capital case requires such a 'heightened' standard in pre-trial proceedings would invariably conclude that defendants in non
death penalty cases would warrant a lesser standard of due
360
process."
The Judge also rejected a challenge to various counts of the
indictment charging murder in the first degree pursuant to section 125.27(1)(a)(vii), "felony murder" which alleged a different
felony offense against the same victims. The defendant contended that they were multiplicitous because the killing involved the same person. In rejecting this claim Judge Demakos
observed:
In this case, each of the various counts charging Murder in
the First Degree requires proof that the alleged killing of the victim occurred during the furtherance of a different felony. The defendant was properly charged with respect to different counts of
Murder in the First Degree as to each of the three decedents because his alleged conduct, though emanating from one set of acts
involving each victim, violated various sections of the Penal Law.
The mere fact that the Legislature chose to list a series of felonies
together within one of the twelve subparagraphs of the aggravating factors (paragraph vii) cannot be taken to mean that they intended to allow only one count of intentional murder during the
357. People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1997, at 35, col. 6 (N.Y. County Ct.
Dec. 4, 1997) (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
358. In Shulman, 658 N.Y.S.2d 794, the defendant was subsequently convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. In light of the New
York Court of Appeals decision in People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2002), it
appears extremely unlikely that the sentence of death will survive similar
scrutiny.
359. People v. Gordon, 667 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (citing Hale, 661
N.Y.S.2d 457; People v. Chinn, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1996, at 31, col. 3 (N.Y. County
Ct. Nov. 19, 1996)).
360. Gordon, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
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course of a felony to be charged, even if a defendant committed an
intentional killing in the furtherance of multiple felonies. 361
The first divergence of opinion concerning the need for
"heightened due process" in New York capital jurisprudence
came in People v. Arthur.362 Despite the fact the proceedings
were still in the discovery phase, Justice Kahn held:
The parties agree that a heightened standard of due process
pertains in capital cases. Defendant asserts that this standard
should be applied at all stages of a capital case, based upon legislative intent, state constitutional law, decisions rendered under
the predecessor statute, and federal constitutional law. The People, on the other hand, argue that a heightened standard of due
process applies only at a capital sentencing proceeding and not at
pretrial or trial stages, citing Californiav. Ramos and other cases.
They also note that numerous courts of coordinate jurisdiction in
this state have rejected the application of heightened due process
in a capital case prior to the sentencing proceeding.
Defendant's initial arguments merit only brief discussion
while the Legislature, in reinstating the death penalty, enacted
special protections for capital defendants, e.g., specially trained
and appointed counsel (Jud.L. § 35-b), additional time for pretrial
motions (CPL § 250.40[3]), individual voir dire of prospective jurors (CPL § 270.16), and direct appeals as of right to the Court of
Appeals (CPL § 450.80[3]), there is no specific legislative provision requiring a trial court to apply heightened scrutiny or more
exacting substantive standards to every aspect of a capital case.
The Legislature's express amendment of certain provisions of existing law, taken together with its failure to modify other provisions creates an inference of a legislative intent to leave such
existing provisions intact. 3 63
361. Id. at 629 (footnotes omitted).
362. People v. Arthur and Hart, 673 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
363. In Heard, Justice Rothwax citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992
(1983), held:
the Supreme Court recognized only that "the qualitative difference of death
from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of
scrutiny of the sentencing determination ... The Court's principal concern
has been more with the procedure by which the State imposes the death
sentence ... once it has been determined that the defendant falls within the
category of persons eligible for the death penalty." Therefore, there are no
due process protections peculiar to the defendant and others facing a possible first degree murder indictment that are not available to other
defendants.
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To the extent that defendant seeks an interpretation of the
New York State Constitution as requiring an expansion of defendant's due process rights during the guilt phase, this court is
without authority to make such a determination. A trial court is
constrained not to announce new, noninterpretative, policy-driven
constructions of the State Constitution, for to do so would impinge
perceived
upon "the policy and rulemaking function traditionally
364
as the exclusive domain of the Court of Appeals."
Despite this apparent rejection of the defendant's argument, Justice Kahn went on to conduct a further analysis, observing "[d]efendant's argument concerning the implications of
the federal Constitution, however, requires closer attention.
Because I believe both sides here have misapprehended the
teachings of the Supreme Court as to the higher standard to be
applied in capital cases, I find it necessary to examine those de3 65
cisions in some detail."
The Judge then proceeded to conduct a thorough, if not exhaustive, analysis of the Supreme Court decisions which discussed "heightened due process" as well as when such scrutiny
is appropriate along with its constitutional underpinnings, ultimately holding:
Thus in my view, the Supreme Court's decisions applying
heightened scrutiny, as well as the inherent structure of New
York's unique capital punishment legislation, support defendant's
position to the extent that he urges that the higher procedural
standards designed to assure greater reliability of a capital sentencing decision are not cabined strictly within the capital sentencing proceeding authorized by CPL § 400.27. Any aspect of a
capital case which directly affects the reliability of the fact-finding
process regarding sentencing should be subject to heightened
scrutiny. While certain stages of capital litigation would rarely, if
ever, present such a circumstance (e.g., grand jury proceedings or
arraignment), the same cannot be said of the discovery process.
For example, the inability of the defense in a capital case to have
access prior to trial to information bearing directly on either aggravating or mitigating factors, whether or not such information
was exculpatory, and to pursue its own investigation of such inPeople v. Heard, N.Y. L.J., May 17, 1996, at 26, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 17, 1996).
364. People v. Arthur, 673 N.Y.S.2d 483, 493-94 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (citations
omitted).
365. Id. at 494.
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formation in advance of trial, could prevent the jury from considering evidence which could be dispositive of its sentencing
determination in a given case, or, at the very least, from "hav[ing]
before it all relevant information about the individual whose fate
366
it must determine."
While the court declined to enter a blanket order applying
"heightened due process" to all stages of the proceedings, it did
apply it in determining the defendant's discovery demands
thereby becoming the first and only trial court in the State to
require such.
Slightly over one year after its initial decisions in People v.
McIntosh, New York County Court in Dutchess County, following the defendant's conviction on four counts of capital murder,
was called upon to address two challenges to section 400.27 of
the Criminal Procedure Law.
The first People v. McIntosh involved a claim that section
67
400.27(11) was unconstitutional:
[T]o the extent that the second clause of this provision provides
for a vague and standardless determination by a capital sentencing jury whether to impose a sentence of death or a sentence of
life in prison without parole on a defendant. 368
Defendant contends that this provision is inconsistent with
the exacting standards and heightened protections associated
with the death penalty law, and violates state and federal law.
Specifically, defendant argues that Criminal Procedure Law
§ 400.27(11) will impermissibly penalize his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment, his fundamental right to life, his
right to equal protection, his right to confrontation, his right to
due process, and other rights safeguarded under the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution; Article I, Sections One, Two, Three, Four,
Five, Six, Eleven, Twelve, and Fourteen of the New York State
366. Id. at 498 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
367. People v. McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d 795 (County Ct. 1998).
368. In a footnote to its decision, the court set out the relevant portion of the
statute:
Criminal Procedure Law 400.27(11)(a) provides in relevant part: "The jury
may not direct imposition of a sentence of death unless it unanimously finds

beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factor or factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factor or factors established, if any, and
unanimously determines that the penalty of death should be imposed."
Id. at 796 n.1 (alteration in original).
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Constitution; Civil Rights Law, Section 12; and Criminal Procedure Law, Section 400.27.369
In dealing with the defendant's challenge, Judge Marlow
reviewed the various requirements laid down by the Supreme

Court in Gregg, Furman, McCleskey, Lowenfield, Jurek and
Godfrey, which mandated that the states narrow the class of
death eligible defendants appropriately.3 70 He then cited Ramos and McCleskey which require the states to allow the jury to
consider a "myriad of factors," without limiting the jury's consideration of any relevant circumstance in mitigation of the
penalty. 371 Analyzing the New York statute in light of these
considerations, he concluded that it passed constitutional muster.3 7 2 In particular, the Judge noted that the statute's two-step
process: (1) involving the weighing of aggravating factors
against mitigating factors, and (2) allowing the defendant to
raise any relevant mitigating factor including reliable hearsay,
37 3
satisfied the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court.
In addressing the challenge to the particular language contained in Criminal Procedure Law section 400.27(11), Judge
Marlow opined:
The New York statute permits a jury to decide that the aggravating circumstances, substantially and beyond a reasonable doubt,
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, but, nevertheless decline
to impose the death penalty. See CPL § 400.27(11). This court
sees nothing wrong with permitting-for a defendant's374benefit-a
narrow window through which human mercy can fit.
The second McIntosh decision, which was an amplification
of the court's oral ruling, addressed a challenge that the defendant had made to Criminal Procedure Law section
400.27(1O). 3 75 The decision was amplified after a jury had de369. McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
370. Id. (discussing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
371. McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (citing McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306; Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1008).
372. Id. at 797.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
375. Id. at 791.
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termined that the defendant should be sentenced to life without
parole. Judge Marlow framed the challenge the following way:
Defendant challenges CPL § 400.27(10) on the ground that it
may coerce those jurors at the penalty phase, who believe that
defendant should be sentenced to life in prison without parole,
into abandoning their position and, instead, voting for death
based on their knowledge that a jury's non-unanimity would result in an indeterminate sentence of 20 to 25 years to life.376

The Judge noted at the outset of his discussion of this point
that, "it appears that this provision is unique in mandating that
the court impose a sentence less severe than either of the options available to the jury if they are deadlocked." 3 77
After citing the decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in State v. Ramseur and State v. Bey, which upheld an analogous statute in that State, Judge Marlow went on to observe:
Defendant's argument that the New York statute is unconstitutional, as unduly coercive, is based on unwarranted speculation
that jurors who are otherwise disposed to a life sentence without
parole will ignore the instructions which this court will give, forsake their life sentence positions, and instead vote for a death
sentence, only to prevent what may be in their minds, an unacceptable third alternative, i.e., an indeterminate sentence with eligibility for parole consideration after 20 to 25 years. Certainly,
the converse is more likely-that is, a juror who might otherwise
favor a death sentence may be willing to accede to the lesser penalty of life in prison without parole in order to avoid the possibil378
ity of parole.
In resolving the challenge, Judge Marlow, at the outset of
his analysis, noted that the defendant had cited no controlling
federal authority for his position.3 7 9 He then adopted the reasoning of the court in Shulman.38 0 In Shulman, the trial court
376. McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 793. In particular issue was the language in
Criminal Procedure Law section 400.27(10) which recites, "The court must also
instruct the jury that in the event the jury fails to reach unanimous agreement
with respect to the sentence, the court will sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment with a minimum term of between twenty and twenty-five years and
a maximum term of life." Id. at 793.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 793-94.
379. Id. at 793.
380. McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
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rejected a similar challenge analogizing the instruction to that
required by Criminal Procedure Law section 300.10(3), which
advises a jury that commitment proceedings to the Department
of Mental Health will result where a defendant is found "Not
Responsible" pursuant to New York Penal Law section 40.15.381
Judge Marlow also noted that, "the language of [section]
400.27(10) is mandatory and this statute, like all others, carries
with it a strong presumption of validity, to be stricken as uncon38 2
stitutional only as a last resort."
Like many of the other trial court judges that were asked to
invalidate portions of the death penalty scheme, Judge Marlow
invoked the statutory proscription against trial courts declaring
legislative enactments unconstitutional. 38 3 Ultimately he concluded that:
In the absence of controlling federal authority to the contrary,
and because CPL § 400.27(10) is at least arguably valid, this court
sees no basis whatsoever to strike this section as unconstituto adtional. This issue is best left for the State's highest3court
s4
dress should it ever properly come before that body.
As noted previously, challenges to Criminal Procedure Law
section 270.20(1)(f) and the constitutionality of the death penalty itself were raised in People v. Arroyo, in Schoharie County
38 5
Court, prior to the cases being resolved by plea bargaining.
Judge Bartlett, in deciding the initial challenge to Criminal
Procedure Law section 270.20(1)(f) at the outset noted that
there is a strong presumption of constitutionality afforded state
legislative enactments. 38 6 He then wrote:
381. See People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 30, 1998, at 35, col. 4 (N.Y. County
Ct. 1998). In Shulman, Judge Pitts cited Mateo in which Judge Connell also
adopted the reasoning of the New Jersey appellate courts approving this instruction. Id.
382. McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
383. Id. "A statute should not ordinarily be set aside as unconstitutional by a
court of original jurisdiction unless such conclusion is inescapable. Courts of first
instance should not exercise transcendent power of declaring an act of the Legislature unconstitutional except in rare cases involving life and liberty .

. . ."

N.Y.

§ 150 (McKinney 2003); see also People v. McIntosh, 662 N.Y.S.2d 214,
220 (County Ct. 1997)
384. McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
385. See People v. Arroyo, 679 N.Y.S.2d 885 (County Ct. 1998); 683 N.Y.S.2d
788 (County Ct. 1998).
386. Arroyo, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
STAT. LAW
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This subdivision of the "challenge for cause" statute is part of the
comprehensive death penalty legislation. The aim of the statute
is to preclude the selection ofjurors who would automatically vote
for or against the death penalty because of their own strongly
held personal beliefs and to ensure that all jurors selected will be
able to set their personal beliefs aside and follow the Court's instructions on the law at the sentencing phase of the trial. 387
Mter citing the various Supreme Court decisions which
mandate these standards, the Judge turned to the New York
State precedent citing People v. DiPiazza.38 8 Ultimately he
held:
The Court, having determined that the "challenge for cause"
provision satisfies both the state and federal constitutions, further determines that it is neither necessary nor statutorily authorized that the voir dire scheme enacted by the legislature be
replaced at this juncture by the alternate relief requested by the
defendants, e.g., empaneling separate juries for the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, or that all voir dire on the life and
death qualification standard be deferred to just prior to the sentencing phase of the trial.
Nor is it necessary to deviate from the prescribed order of voir
dire set forth in CPL § 270.16(1). A plain reading of the statute
requires that on motion of either party, each individual juror be
questioned commencing with questions by the prosecutor. The
Court will diligently monitor the voir dire process to ensure that
this phase of the trial does not influence the jurors for or against
conviction or the death penalty. 38 9
One of the interesting features of this decision was the
court's reliance on the decisions of other trial courts, which had
addressed this issue since the death penalty had been re-enacted.39 0 In addition to DiPiazza, Judge Bartlett also cited
Hale, McIntosh, Harris, and Chinn, as authority for the determination that Criminal Procedure Law section 270.20(1)(f) was
3 91
constitutional.
The defendants' challenge to the constitutionality of the
death penalty met with a similar result. In raising this chal387. Id.

388. Id. at 887 (citing People v. DiPiazza, 248 N.E.2d 412 (N.Y. 1969)).
389. Arroyo, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
390. See generally Arroyo, 679 N.Y.S.2d 885.

391. Id. at 887.
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lenge, the defendants contended that New York Penal Law section 125.27 and Criminal Procedure Law section 400.27,
"constitute cruel and unusual punishment, violate the defendants' fundamental right to life, and invite the arbitrary and discriminatory, including racially discriminatory, imposition of the
'3 92
death penalty.
Judge Bartlett began his decision regarding this claim by
noting, as he did in his previous decision, that State statutes
enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. 393 He then went on to
cite Gregg for having approved a bifurcated proceeding for individualized sentencing, like New York's. 394 Turning to New York
Law, he observed:
The State Constitution infers the constitutionality of capital
punishment in that the need for certain special procedures for
crimes punishable by death is referred to in several sections of
Article I. In Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, the Appellate Division,
Second Department, stated: "This Court has previously observed
that 'any inquiry into the existence of enhanced protection by the
State Constitution... [is better left] to the Court of Appeals. .. as
the State's policy-making tribunal."' Therefore, this Court declines to determine whether or not the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of Article I, § 5 prohibits what other sections of
Article I clearly accommodate, and provides constitutional protections greater than those required by the United States
395
Constitution.
The defendants had made a very interesting and unique
challenge to the statutes, as applied to them individually, based
on their race and gender, which Judge Bartlett took up next:
Defendant Edwards argues that the death penalty has been
sought in his case because he is white and the prosecutor needs
white conviction statistics to balance the number of black convictions. Defendant Arroyo argues that the death penalty is sought
against her because she is a woman and conviction statistics for
women are needed to balance those for men; and also, that the
death penalty is sought most frequently in cases in which a white
3 96
person, in this case a white Hispanic, is the victim.

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Arroyo, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
Id.
Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976)).
Arroyo, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (citations omitted).
Id. at 790.
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The court, however, rejected these novel challenges as being both unpersuasive and premature. 397 Further, the court
noted the conduct of the offense satisfied the elements of New
York Penal Law section 125.27(1)(a)(vii), and there was no evidence of the prosecutor engaging in discrimination based on
race or gender. 398 He went on to observe:
However, it should be noted that New York's capital punishment scheme ensures a standard and uniform application by including an extra protection for the defendant: review of the
defendant's case in the context of all other similar cases. Whenever a sentence of death is imposed, the Court of Appeals is mandated to review the judgement [sic] and sentence; the scope of
review includes determining whether a death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary or legally impermissible factor including the race of the
defendant or a victim of the crime; and whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and
399
of the defendant.
Finally, Judge Bartlett rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to the death penalty in which the defendants claimed it
violated society's prevailing standards of decency, writing:
The Court has considered the defendants' argument that the
death penalty runs counter to prevailing societal standards of decency and finds this argument erroneous in light of the United
States Supreme Court acceptance of capital punishment and in
light of this State's significant and persistent history of death
0
penalty legislation. 40
Like he did in his previous decision, Judge Bartlett sought
refuge in the decisions of the other trial courts, which had dealt
with this issue, citing Harris, Shulman,4 1 Chinn and
McIntosh.402
397. Id.

398. Id.
399. Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 470.30(3)).
400. Arroyo, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (citations omitted).

401. See People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997, at 35, col. 5 (N.Y.
County Ct. Sept. 26, 1997). Like Judge Barlett, Judge Pitt in Shulman cited both
Hale and Chinn for authority that this statute comported with Eighth Amendment

guarantees. Id.
402. Arroyo, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
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An extremely novel question was presented in People v.
Lavalle, in which the defendant sought to waive his right to pre40 3
sent mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of his trial.
Compounding the complexity of this issue was the fact that the
Capital Defender's office, which represented the defendant, opposed the defendant's request. 404 In addressing this situation,

Judge Mullen observed:
One of the arguments of defense counsel is that there is a
"public interest" here, a societal interest, as it were, which overrides a defendant's right to waive the opportunity to offer mitigation. The defense claims that to allow the defendant, Stephen
Lavalle, to forego any mitigation would, in effect, result in a courtassisted suicide.
In support, the defense attorneys rely on the holding of the
highest court in New Jersey in State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225,
548 A.2d 939 (1988); see also, Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 808,
100 S.Ct. 29, 62 L.Ed.2d 11 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
While this Court agrees that Koedatich does support defense
counsel's argument, I conclude it does not control the situation at
bar, because the New Jersey death penalty statute is essentially
different from New York's. For one thing, the New Jersey statute
allows a defendant facing a murder, first degree, prosecution to
waive his right to a jury trial, and/or plead guilty to murder, first
degree, and still face the possibility of the death penalty. That
cannot happen in New York.
Further, the New Jersey statute provides that "the defendant
shall have the burden of producing evidence of the existence of
any mitigating factor set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsection
." (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3[c][2][a] [emphasis added]).
In contrast, the New York statute provides "... . the defendant
may present any evidence relevant to any mitigating factor set
forth in subdivision nine of this section ....
The Judge then proceeded to analyze the statutory scheme
of both states, pointing out a variety of differences in the various rights and responsibilities that each party bore in each
state, before concluding "that under the New York statute, and
case law, defendant Stephen Lavalle has the right to waive the
403. See People v. Lavalle, 697 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
404. See generally id.
405. Id. at 242 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(6)).
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opportunity to offer mitigating factors at his sentencing
40 6
proceeding."
At first blush, it seems somewhat anomalous that a defendant can waive his or her right to present mitigating evidence
during what is arguably the most critical and outcome determinative phase of the capital proceedings, but cannot waive appellate review pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law section
470.30(2).407 As noted earlier, this statute was amended in 1995
to make appellate review mandatory and non-waivable. Although no explicit reason was provided for the addition of this
restriction, in the various memoranda that accompanied and
discussed this enactment, the Governor, in his approval Memorandum, took pains to point out the constitutional protections
included in the enactment, saying:
The legislation I approve today will be the most effective of its
kind in the nation. It is balanced to safeguard defendants' rights
while ensuring that our state has a fully credible and enforceable
death penalty statute....
Constitutional concerns and the infirmities contained in prior
08
New York State law are fully met in this bill .... 4
Thus, it seems that including this particular safeguard, along
with the other protections, was to enhance the prospect that the
scheme would survive constitutional attack, as well as guard
against a defendant committing "court-assisted suicide" as de40 9
fense counsel argued in Lavalle.
People v. Owens, which arose in New York State Supreme
Court, Monroe County, initially dealt with the constitutionality
of Criminal Procedure Law section 320.10(1), which prohibits a
defendant from waiving a jury when charged with murder in
the first degree. 4 10 At the outset of its decision rejecting this
challenge, Justice Egan noted that the claim was brought,
406. Id.
407. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30(2) (McKinney 2003).
408. Governor's Approval Memorandum on "Death Penalty," S.2850 (Volker);
A.4843 (Vitaliano) Memoranda, reprinted in 1995 NEw YORK STATE LEG. ANNUAL
23.
409. Lavalle, 697 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
410. See People v. Owens, 710 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (citing N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 320.10 (McKinney 2003)).
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. ,411 Justice
"[u]nder the guise of 'heightened due process'
Egan, like almost all of the other trial courts which construed
this statutory scheme, ultimately rejected this approach noting,
does not warrant
"Defendant's claim of heightened due process
4 12
rewriting the death penalty statutes."
While the court did find that his indictment brought the
defendant within the ambit of the challenged statute, it, nonetheless, found that the challenge was premature since the defendant has not requested a bench trial. 413 Nevertheless, citing
McIntosh and Mateo, Justice Egan held that the defendant had
failed to demonstrate that neither the statute nor article I, section 2 of the New York State Constitution had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be unconstitutional. 414 The Justice
also rejected the argument that depriving a capital defendant 4of
15
a bench trial was a deprivation of equal protection of the law.
In Hale, Justice Tomei wrote:
Since the notion that "death is different" has otherwise pervaded the defendant's motion papers, it is ironic that he argues
that his equal protection rights are violated because the provisions of the New York Constitution and C.P.L. § 320.10(1) treat
capital defendants differently than other accused persons. In any
event, capital defendants may not be considered a suspect class
for the purpose of equal protection analysis. Moreover, there is a
rational basis for requiring that, in all trials in which the charged
crime may be punishable by death, rather than leaving the defendant's fate to the judgment of a single individual, the decision
the conshould be made by a jury of twelve persons 4reflecting
16
scious and moral judgment of the community.
The court was next confronted with a challenge to the felony murder provision of Penal Law section 125.27(1)(a)(vii),
based upon the contention that it was under-inclusive in that it
did not encompass the commission of all serious felonies in this
411. Owens, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
412. Id. at 792.
413. Id. at 791-92.
414. Id. at 792 (citing People v. McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d 791 (County Ct.
1998); People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (County Ct. 1997)).
415. Owens, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (citing Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 484).
416. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 484 (citations omitted).
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Egan

Defendant's argument is incongruous in the context of this
case. Defendant does not argue that an intentional murder committed during the course of a rape should not be sanctionable by
death, just that murders committed during other forms of sexual
abuse merit the same sanction. Defendant claims that this purported inconsistency renders the statute arbitrary.
A capital punishment statute need only "genuinely narrow
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." This court
declines to thrust itself into the role of the legislature and determine which murders warrant the sanction of death. 4 18
As noted earlier, this challenge was determined to be without
merit by the New York Court of Appeals in Harris.4 19 Following
his conviction by a jury for murder in the first degree, the defendant sought to be allowed to give an unsworn allocution following summations during the penalty phase. 420 Justice Egan

denied this request holding that the defendant had no constitutional right to do So. 4 2 1 In denying this request, Justice Egan
expressly disagreed with the decisions in Harris and Shulman.422 These holdings are set forth in Shulman as follows:

Nevertheless, the court is persuaded by the reasoning of Justice
Feldman in People v. Harris,who states:
The question for us is not what the Constitution commands
but what our civilization commends. Under our system of
capital punishment, a jury of men and women forms the essential link between society and the defendant before the
court. Each capital jury expresses the collective voice of society in making the individualized determination that a defendant shall live or die. Whatever the constitution permits, it
bespeaks our common humanity that a defendant not be sen417. See People v. Owens, 713 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (County Ct. 2000).
418. Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)) (additional citations omitted).
419. See People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 714 (N.Y. 2002).
420. See People v. Owens, 729 N.Y.S.2d 285, 285 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
421. Id. (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)).
422. Id.
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tenced to death by jury "which never heard the sound of his
voice." (cite omitted).
Justice Feldman permitted Harris to address the sentencing jury
prior to summation "but only to plead for mercy and leniency or to
express his remorse." The court directed further that in the event
defendant attempted to stray from these parameters "to either advance or dispute facts in evidence or to offer facts or reasons to
exculpate himself," he invited an admonishment in the presence
of the jury which would further be delivered to disregard the extraneous matter.
Accordingly, defendant's motion is granted solely to the ex423
tent permitted in Harris.

As noted above, Owens requested to address the jury after
summations rather than before as was allowed in Harris and
Shulman.424 Notwithstanding this distinction, it appears that
Justice Egan's ruling would not have been any different given
his determination that there was no statutory or constitutional
authority for it.425
While the foregoing is not an exhaustive review of the decisions rendered by the trial courts in capital cases, it is a representative look at the wide variety of issues they have been
confronted with since the resurrection of the death penalty. Of
particular interest in analyzing them is the extent to which
they were almost unanimous in their approach to certain issues, such as "heightened due process" 426 and challenges to the
constitutionality of the legislative scheme. 4 27 Indeed, as previously discussed, not only was there near unanimity among the
trial courts in resolving these challenges, but as the history of
death penalty litigation has progressed, the trial courts that
423. People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1999, at 35, col. 3 (N.Y. County Ct.
May 6, 1999).
424. See Owens, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
425. See generally id.
426. Compare People v. Chinn, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1996, at 31, col. 3 (N.Y.
County Ct. Nov. 19, 1996), People v. Rodriguez, 647 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1996),
Shulman, N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1999, at 35, col. 3, People v. McIntosh, 662 N.Y.S.2d
212 (County Ct. 1997), People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1997), People v.
Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (County Ct. 1996), and People v. Gordon, 667 N.Y.S.2d
626 (Sup. Ct. 1997), with People v. Prater, 648 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. 1996), and
People v. Arthur, 673 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
427. See, e.g., People v. Arroyo, 679 N.Y.S.2d 885 (County Ct. 1998).
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have been resolving challenges later in the cycle have not hesi4 28
tated to cite their brethren who decided earlier claims.
Future Issues
At this writing, the New York Court of Appeals has four
statements of issues likely to be raised on appeal [hereinafter,
Statements] filed with it, along with the Appellant's Brief in Cahill.429 These cases, in addition to Cahill, are Lavalle, Mateo
and Shulman. The non-binding Statements in these cases set
forth a total of 225 potential issues, which may be raised on appeal. 430 While many of the issues raised in the Statements filed
in each case are unique to the particular trial proceedings, the
Statements also contain some common issues.
In each of the cases in which such Statements have been
filed, four issues have been raised which are identical. These
are the: (1) constitutionality of Penal Law section 125.27; (2)
exclusion of mitigation evidence during the sentencing proceedings; (3) constitutionality of Criminal Procedure Law section
400.27(10) which concerns the "anticipatory deadlock instruc431
tions;" and (4) the method of execution.
In Mateo, Cahill and Shulman, each of the trial Judges are
reported to have passed upon the challenges to Penal Law section 125.27.432 In Mateo, Judge Connell denied the defendant's
motion to declare Penal Law section 125.27 to be unconstitutional, finding that it was neither vague and overbroad, nor that
it failed to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death pen428. Compare People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 30, 1998, at 35, col. 4 (N.Y.
County Ct. Jan. 30, 1998), and Shulman, N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1999, at 35, col. 3, with
Owens, 729 N.Y.S.2d 285.
429. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, People v. Cahill,

__

N.Y.2d

__,

2003 N.Y.

Slip. Op. 18881 (Nov. 25, 2003) No. 123); Appellant's non-binding Statement of
Issues Likely to be Raised on Appeal (on file with author).
430. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Cahill (No. 123) (194 potential issues remain for possible consideration by the New York Court of Appeals at this writing
since the Appellant in Cahill chose to brief only thirty-eight of the sixty-nine issues
set forth in his non-binding Statement of Issues Likely to be Raised on Appeal).
431. Appellant's non-binding Statement of Issues Likely to be Raised on Appeal (on file with author).
432. See generally People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (County Ct. 1997); Cahill, No. 123, slip. op. at 18881; People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997 at 35,
col. 5 (N.Y. County Ct. Sept. 26, 1997).
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alty. 433 In Cahill, Judge Burke, citing Mateo, adopted this reasoning. 434 In Shulman, Judge Pitts addressed a challenge to
Criminal Procedure Law section 400.27, holding that it was not
unconstitutionally vague. 435 He then went on to note:
The same result must be afforded Penal Law
§125.27(1)(a)(xi). Initially, it must be noted that the phrase "serial
murder," while employed in the practice commentaries, is not
used in the statute. Moreover, the phrase "common scheme or
plan" is commonly used and has long been the subject of judicial
construction. Crucially, nothing in the statute is beyond the ken
436
of the ordinary person.
As discussed previously, almost all of the lower courts that
have addressed challenges to the statute have determined it
passes constitutional muster. 437 Likewise, the New York Court
of Appeals in Harrisnot only rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of Penal Law section 125.27(1)(a)(vii), 438 but demonstrated a willingness to consider the holdings of the lower
courts as reflected in its citing the reasoning in Hale.4 39 Notwithstanding the court's recognition that "heightened due process" applies to its examination of death penalty verdicts, there
is little reason to expect that it will not subject the challenges to
the constitutionality of the various parts of the statutory
scheme to the same exacting scrutiny that was undertaken by
the courts below it.
433. See Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 987-91.

434. Cahill is an unreported decision available on the New York State Office
of Court Administration "Legal Scholar" Program (on file with author).
435. See Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997, at 35, col. 5 (citing Tuilaepa v.

California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994); People v. Nelson, 506 N.E.2d 907 (N.Y. 1987)).
436. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997 at 35, col. 5 (citations omitted). The
defendant subsequently made a more precise attack on this subsection of Penal
Law section 125.27, but the court refused to entertain it because it was not in
compliance with motion schedule set by the court and referred back to the above
quoted decision. See Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 14, 1997 at 25, col. 1 (N.Y. County
Ct. Nov. 14, 1997).
437. See People v. Arroyo, 683 N.Y.S.2d 788 (County Ct. 1998); People v. Harris, 676 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1998); People v. Chinn, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1996, at
31, col. 3 (N.Y. County Ct. Nov. 19, 1996); People v. Gordon, 667 N.Y.S.2d 626
(Sup. Ct. 1997).
438. See People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 713 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)).
439. Id. at 714 (citing People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1997)).
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Before the New York Court of Appeals can reach the issues
of exclusion of mitigating evidence, the constitutionality of
Criminal Procedure Law section 400.27(10), and the method of
execution in Cahill,440 Mateo44 1 and Shulman,442 it will once
these convicagain have to grapple with the issue of whether
443
tions are impacted by its holding in Tomei.
The issue concerning the impact of Tomei in Cahill appears
to be somewhat different than in Mateo and Shulman.444 The
defendant in Cahill was indicted for murder in the first degree
on November 19, 1998, and entered a plea of not guilty the following day. 44 5 On December 22, 1998, the New York Court of
Appeals decided Tomei,446 invalidating the plea provisions set
forth in Criminal Procedure Law sections 220.10(5)(e) and
220.30(3)(b)(vii). 447 The prosecution did not file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty pursuant to Criminal Procedure
Law section 250.40 until December 30, 1998.448 Thus the defendant had a window of opportunity, albeit a small one, to enter a
plea of guilty to the charge of murder in the first degree. This
would not have coerced him to give up his constitutional rights
against self-incrimination and trial by jury in order to avoid the
death penalty, 44 9 which he failed to avail himself of. Thus,
Tomei may have no application to the defendant's case.
In Mateo and Shulman, by contrast, the death penalty notice had been filed at the time each of the defendants had moved
to challenge the plea provisions and, as such, neither defendant
was ever in a position to plead guilty to the indictments without
440.
441.
442.
Sept. 26,
443.

People
People
People
1997).
Hynes

v. Cahill,__ N.Y.2d _, 2003 N.Y. Slip. Op. 18881 (Nov. 25, 2003).
v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (County Ct. 1997).
v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997 at 35, col. 5 (N.Y. County Ct.
v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).

444. See generally Cahill, __ N.Y.2d

__,

2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 18881.

445. See id.
446. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
447. See generally id.
448. Cahill, __ N.Y.2d

__,

2003 N.Y. Slip. Op. 18881 at *4.

449. See Francois v. Dolan, 731 N.E.2d 614 (N.Y. 2000) (holding a defendant
could not enter a plea of guilty to a potentially capital indictment during the 120
day period statutorily provided to the prosecution to file a notice of intent to seek
the death penalty. This was not decided until May 18, 2000).
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running afoul of the proscription of Tomei. 450 As a result, the
New York Court of Appeals may have to set aside the death
sentences in those cases as it did in Harris. The appellant in
Cahill has tried to shoehorn his case into Tomei by arguing:
At the time Mr. Cahill was indicted on first-degree murder
charges, the New York death penalty statute unconstitutionally
burdened a capital defendant's Fifth Amendment right to plead
not guilty and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Because
Mr. Cahill pled not guilty and exercised his right to a jury trial
under the unconstitutional statutory scheme, and the jury ultimately imposed the death penalty, his sentences must be
451
vacated.
The New York Court of Appeals made it clear in both Tomei and
Harris452 that because the plea provisions were severable from
the rest of the legislation, it was not necessary to invalidate the
statutory scheme, and the court may conduct its analysis of this
45 3
claim accordingly.
The issues presented in each of the cases involving the exclusion of mitigating evidence may offer a more mixed set of
outcomes. Indeed the results, with the exception of the ruling
in Lavalle,454 may turn upon the nature of the evidence excluded and its relevance in the sentencing phase of the proceedings. In Cahill, the appellant contends that it was error to
exclude testimony from the deputy sheriffs who supervised him
in the county jail that he would be a positive influence in state
prison.455 In Mateo, 456 it is contended that the court erred in
450. See generally People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (County Ct. 1997); People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997, at 35, col. 5 (N.Y. County Ct. Sept. 26,
1997).
451. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 683, People v. Cahill, - N.Y.2d -, 2003
N.Y. Slip. Op. 18881 (Nov. 25, 2003) (No. 123) (citations omitted). At this writing
the Respondent's Brief has not been filed with the New York Court of Appeals.
452. See Tomei, 706 N.E.2d at 1207; People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 747-48
(N.Y. 2002).
453. Indeed, in Tomei, Judge Kaye expressly noted:
While reducing the flexibility of plea bargaining in capital cases, excision of
the unconstitutionalprovisions does not prevent pleas of guilty to first degree
murder when no notice of intent to seek the death penalty is pending, since
defendants in that situation face the same maximum sentence regardlessof
how they are convicted.
Tomei, 706 N.E.2d at 1209 (emphasis added).
454. People v. Lavalle, 697 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
455. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 583, Cahill, (No. 123).
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refusing to allow evidence to be presented about the defendant's
mother without notice of intent to offer psychiatric evidence and
an evaluation by the prosecution's expert, as well as the defendant's childhood hospital records. 457 The defense in Shulman,458 like Cahill sought to offer testimony from a former
deputy warden at San Quentin Prison that the defendant could
adjust successfully and make a positive contribution to prison
45 9
life while serving a life sentence.
As noted previously, Criminal Procedure Law section
400.27, which sets forth the mitigating factors to be considered
by the sentencing jury, contains a catch-all provision at subsection (9)(f) which recites, "[a]ny other circumstance concerning
the crime, the defendant's state of mind or condition at the time
of the crime, or the defendant's character, background or record
that would be relevant to mitigation or punishment for the
460
crime shall be considered."
Both Justice Feldman in Harris,and Judge Marlow in McIntosh, drew attention to this provision in their determinations
that the sentencing scheme embodied in Criminal Procedure
Law section 400.27 was constitutional. 46 1 Moreover, while the
New York Court of Appeals declined to pass upon the propriety
of the appellant's sentencing proceedings in Harris, it did admonish that "capital trial courts should exercise great caution
in making discretionary determinations such as this. The
46 2
stakes are high for all involved."
Thus it appears that, while an error may be deemed harmless during the guilt phase of a trial, such as was done in Harris, the court may not be willing to view it as such during the
sentencing phase. 463 Analyzed in this context, the appellant in
Mateo, whose proposed testimony appears to fall into the catch456. People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (County Ct. 1997).
457. Appellant's non-binding Statement of Issues Likely to be Raised on Appeal (on file with author).
458. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997, at 35, col. 5 (N.Y. County Ct. Sept.
26, 1997).
459. Appellant's non-binding Statement of Issues Likely to be Raised on Appeal (on file with author).
460. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(f) (McKinney 2003).
461. See People v. Harris, 676 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441 (Sup. Ct. 1998); People v.
McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d 795, 796 (County Ct. 1998).
462. People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 723 (N.Y. 2002).
463. See id. at 452.
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all provision embodied in Criminal Procedure Law section
400.27(6)(f), may have success in urging error. 4 6 The proffered
testimony in Cahill also appears to fall clearly within the class
of mitigating evidence allowed under Lockett, 465 and the Supreme Court has ruled that its exclusion requires reversal of a
death sentence. 466 Absent first hand knowledge by the witness
of the appellant's jail house behavior in Shulman,467 the trial
court may have been within its discretionary power to exclude it
as being speculative, although the admonition quoted above
from Harris468 by the New York Court of Appeals makes this a
close question.
As noted previously, the defendant in Lavalle successfully
persuaded the trial court to allow him to forego presenting any
mitigating evidence over the objection of his counsel. 469 Following his conviction, the appellant moved for assignment of new
counsel on appeal contending that he had "an irreconcilable
conflict" with his attorney. 470 The trial court denied the motion
but directed the defendant be allowed "to file a supplemental
pro se brief [to] insure[] that all issues defendant wishe[d] to
raise [were], in fact, [raised] .,471 Presumably, this conflict will

continue as this issue is litigated in the New York Court of
Appeals.
The issue of the constitutionality of the "anticipatory deadlock" instruction contained in Criminal Procedure Law section
400.27(10) was addressed by the trial courts in Cahill, Mateo
and Shulman.472 In Cahill, Judge Burke denied a motion to invalidate "a portion of CPL 400.27(10) requiring the court to instruct the jury on the consequence of a deadlock." 473 The court
464. See generally People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (County Ct. 1997).
465. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
466. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
467. People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997, at 35, col. 5 (N.Y. County
Ct. Sept. 26, 1997).
468. See People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 723 (N.Y. 2002).
469. People v. Lavalle, 697 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
470. People v. Lavalle, 770 N.E.2d 1004, 1004 (N.Y. 2002).
471. Id.
472. See People v. Cahill,__ N.Y.2d __ 2003 N.Y. Slip. Op. 18881, *4 (Nov. 25,
2003); People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (County Ct. 1997); Shulman, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 26, 1997, at 35, col. 5.
473. People v. Cahill is an unreported decision available on the New York
State Office of Court Administration "Legal Scholar" Program (on file with author).
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also rejected a request to merely tell the jury the court would
impose sentence in the event of a deadlock. 474 In Mateo, Judge
Connell rejected the claim that the instruction would have a coercive effect on the jury and render a death verdict more likely,
relying on a decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, State v.
Brown.475 As noted previously, Judge Pitt in Shulman analogized the instruction to that required under Criminal Procedure
Law section 330.10(3) where the defendant has presented a delikewise adopted the
fense of mental disease or defect. 476 4He
77
reasoning of Judge Connell in Mateo.
In Owens, Justice Egan, rejecting a challenge to this section, observed, "[tihe courts of New York have almost uniformly
rejected the notion that Criminal Procedure Law section
400.27(10) is unconstitutional." 478 The Justice went on to list
all of the decisions published and unpublished which had rejected this argument. 479 He noted, however, that the one exception to this was Justice Feldman, who found it unconstitutional
in Harris.480 In doing so, Justice Feldman held:
While the legislative history of the Capital Offenders Law
does not reflect the venomous intent defendant attributes to proponents of CPL 400.27(10), the instruction nevertheless has the
unforeseen but likely practical effect of deliberately injecting uncertainty into the sentencing proceedings. The deadlock instruction alerts the jurors to the possibility that if they do not reach a
unanimous verdict defendant may within 20 or 25 years be released from custody. "A capital sentencing jury is made up of individuals placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called on to
[Tihey are
make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice ....
should be
judgment
their
to
how
as
guidance
given only partial
In
choosing
discretion."
exercised, leaving them with substantial
future
"a
defendant's
of
imprisonment
a
term
and
death
between
in
made
determinations
all
sentencing
on
bears
dangerousness
must
authority
sentencing
"[A]ny
our criminal justice system".
predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it en474. Id.

475. See Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 1001-03 (citing State v. Brown, 651 A.2d 19
(N.J. 1994)).
476. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997, at 35, col. 5.
477. Id.

478. People v. Owens, 727 N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
479. Id.
480. See People v. Harris, 677 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
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gages in the process of determining what punishment to impose."
Thus, in exercising their discretion, the jurors, having been made
aware of the sentence the judge will impose in the event of a deadlock, may conclude that the imposition by the judge of a sentence
of twenty to twenty-five years to life could lead to parole for the
defendant.
Here, the court, in delivering the required instruction under CPL
400.27(10), would be implicitly placing the possibility of defendant's future liberty in the jury's mind. Jurors favoring life without parole may relinquish their conscientiously held views and
join the majority in voting to impose the death penalty to avoid
the possibility of a potentially lighter sentence if they see as a real
prospect defendant's eventual return to society. While the People
argue correctly that such pressure could also lead to a verdict of
life without parole there is simply no way of predicting in what
configuration the jury would be deadlocked and it is thus impossible to anticipate which way the added weight of the deadlock instruction would fall. Under such circumstances the mandated
instruction has the strong potential of acting as a "thumb ... [on]
48
death's side of the scale." '
As Justice Feldman noted, New York is the only state that
has enacted an "anticipatory deadlock" instruction. 48 2 The New
York Court of Appeals, because it invalidated the appellant's
death sentence in Harris,4 3 pursuant to its holding in Tomei, 484
never reached this issue. Clearly, it will have a case of first impression before it, should it be required to pass upon the sentencing proceedings in one of these cases.
The trial courts in Cahill and Mateo were called upon to
address the issue of whether lethal injection authorized by Corrections Law section 658 constituted cruel and unusual punishment.4 8 5 In Cahill, Judge Burke declined to find that it
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 48 6 Judge Connell in
Mateo declined to entertain whether the procedures of the De481. Id. at 661-62 (citations omitted).
482. Id. at 661 (citations omitted).
483. People v. Harris, 675 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct. 1998).

484. Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
485. See People v. Cahill, _ N.Y.2d __, 2003 N.Y. Slip. Op. 18881 (Nov. 25,
2003); People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (County Ct. 1997).
486. People v. Cahill is an unreported decision available on the New York
State Office of Court Administration "Legal Scholar" Program (on file with author).
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partment of Correctional Services were valid or adequate. 487 It
would seem likely that this issue will be subsumed into the
larger question of whether capital punishment in New York
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the New York State Constitution.
Among other issues which are likely to be raised in the four
cases pending in the New York Court of Appeals are whether
the defendants were entitled to a separate sentencing jury, the
admission of victim impact testimony, the constitutionality of
Criminal Procedure Law section 250.40 which grants to the District Attorney the discretion to file a notice of intent to seek the
death penalty, whether a capital defendant has the right to allocute to the jury during the penalty phase of the proceedings,
and the constitutionality of the instruction embodied in Criminal Procedure Law section 400.27(11) concerning whether the
death penalty "should be imposed."
In the appellant's brief in Cahill, he not only raises the issue of the trial court's refusal to empanel a separate sentencing
hearing, as does Shulman, but also claims the trial court failed
to conduct, "an adequate mid-trial voir dire which deprived Mr.
Cahill of his right to due process, a fair and impartial jury and a
48 8
fair and reliable sentencing determination."
The demand for a separate jury for the sentencing phase of trial
proceedings has been rejected by every trial court in which it
has been made.48 9 In Harris,Justice Feldman, after rejecting a
request that death qualification of the jurors be delayed until
just before the start of the penalty phase, noted:
Defendant's alternative suggestion that this court, in the exercise of its discretion, alter the statutory procedure for jury selection is also rejected. The statutory framework only allows for the
impanelling of a separate sentencing jury under extraordinary
circumstances for good cause shown (CPL § 400.27(2)). Because
no such circumstances face this court it has no power to depart
490
from the statute.
487. See generally Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981.

488. Appellant's Brief at 525, Point XXIV, People v. Cahill, slip op. 18881,
2003 WL 22770167 (N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003).
489. See, e.g., Harris,675 N.Y.S.2d 740.
490. Id. at 743.
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Likewise, Judge Bartlett rejected an identical request in Arroyo, holding:
The Court, having determined that the "challenge for cause"
provision satisfies both the state and federal constitutions, further determines that it is neither necessary nor statutorily authorized that the voir dire scheme enacted by the legislature be
replaced at this juncture by the alternative relief requested by the
defendants, e.g., empaneling separate juries for the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, or that all voir dire on the life and
death qualification standard be deferred to just prior to the sen491
tencing phase of the trial.
Finally, Justice Egan disposed of a claim for a separate sentencing jury together with an attempt to waive a jury, in Owens,
observing:
Defendant further claims CPL § 320.10 is anachronistic since
the recently enacted death penalty statutes provide for a bifurcated trial. A defendant's waiver of a jury at the guilt phase now
no longer precludes a jury from sentencing him. Defendant's
claim of heightened due process does not warrant rewriting the
death penalty statutes. Although providing for bifurcation, CPL
§ 400.27(2) envisions the use of a distinct jury for sentencing only
in "extraordinary circumstances" and for "good cause [shown]."492
Given the uniformity of this interpretation by the trial.
courts and the plain language of the statute, it appears unlikely
that the New York Court of Appeals will hold differently absent
a showing of "extraordinary circumstances" and "good cause" in
any of the cases that come before it.
The issue of "victim impact" testimony during the penalty
phase of the proceedings has been identified directly in the
"Statements of Issues Likely to be Raised on Appeal" in both
Lavalle and Shulman and has been raised indirectly in the appellant's brief in Cahill.493 As noted previously, the New York

Court of Appeals cautioned against the use of this type of testimony in its opinion in Harris in which it applied the "harmless
491. People v. Arroyo, 679 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (County Ct. 1998).
492. See People v. Owens, 710 N.Y.S.2d 790, 792 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (citation

omitted).
493. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 631-43, Point XXIX, People v. Cahill,
N.Y.2d

-,

-

2003 Slip. Op. 18881, (Nov. 25, 2003) (No. 123).
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error" rule to the conduct in that instance. 494 It will be interesting to see in these instances whether it will find the admission
of the evidence to be reversible error because it occurred during
the penalty phase or, bowing to the Supremacy Clause, that it is
admissible under Payne.
The initial challenge to the constitutionality of Criminal
Procedure Law section 250.40, which vests the District Attorney with the discretion to file a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty, was made in Hale.495 There, the defendant contended
that filing the notice violated his right to equal protection because the decision to do so was impermissibly affected by his
race. 49 6 Justice Tomei, in rejecting this claim, noted the many
factors which are part of the decision to seek the death penalty
including the strength of the case, the grievousness of the harm,
the various aggravating factors and the presence or absence of
mitigating factors. 497 Moreover, he went on to observe:
Nor may it be said that the discretion left to the District Attorney
violates any constitutional prerogatives. It is well-established
that the prosecutor may be entrusted with charging decisions,
and the exercise of that discretion in the context of capital cases,
unless proved to be for an invidious purpose, is not
unconstitutional. 498
Judge Bartlett, in Arroyo, came to the same conclusion on this
4 99
point.
Whether a defendant in the penalty phase of a capital prosecution should be allowed to allocute to the jury is another issue
that the New York Court of Appeals will be confronted with in
Cahill.500 Although Criminal Procedure Law section 400.27
makes no provision for this allocution, as discussed previously,
two of the trial courts, Harris and Shulman, allowed the defen494. See People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 734 (N.Y. 2002).
495. See People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 471 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
496. Id. at 477.
497. Id. at 477-78 (citing McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
498. Id. at 478 (citations omitted).
499. See People v. Arroyo, 683 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790 (County Ct. 1998) (citing
McClesky, 481 U.S. at 296; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)).
500. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 619, Point XXVIII, People v.Cahill, __
N.Y.2d __, 2003 N.Y. Slip. Op. 18881, (Nov. 25, 2003) (No. 123).
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dant to do so. 50 1 Justice Egan did not allow it in Owens, 50 2 but

that situation is conceptually distinguishable since the defendant sought to do so after summations. Interestingly, Criminal
Procedure Law section 380.50 provides the defendant with the
right to allocution before sentence is pronounced. 50 3 The section
does not distinguish between a capital or non-capital case nor
was it amended in any way at the time Criminal Procedure Law
section 400.27 was enacted setting forth the procedures to be
followed in a capital case. Thus, one could argue that since sentence is to be determined and imposed as a result of the proceeding conducted pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law section
400.27, the defendant should be afforded the right mandated by
Criminal Procedure Law section 380.50 prior to the time sentence is determined, particularly if "heightened due process"
scrutiny applies. Moreover, in Green, a non-capital federal
prosecution, Justice Frankfurter observed:
[W]e see no reason why a procedural rule should be limited to the
circumstances under which it arose if reasons for the right it protects remain. None of these modern innovations lessens the need
for the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present
to the court his plea in mitigation. The most persuasive counsel
may not be able to speak for a defendant as
the defendant might,
50 4
with halting eloquence, speak for himself.
The issue of the right to allocute before the sentencing jury, in
light of these considerations, will present an interesting question for the New York Court of Appeals.
The Cahill appeal will also confront the New York Court of
Appeals with a challenge to the "second step" procedure embodied in Criminal Procedure Law section 400.27(11)(a) which directs the jury in pertinent part that it "may not direct the
imposition of a sentence of death unless it unanimously finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factor or factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factor or factors es501. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2003); see also

People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., May 6,
1999, at 35, col. 3 (N.Y. County Ct. May 6, 1999).
502. See People v. Owens, 729 N.Y.S.2d 285, 285 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
503. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 380.50 (McKinney 2003).
504. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961).
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tablished, if any, and unanimously determines that the penalty
50 5
of death should be imposed."
In challenging the instructions on this point, the appellant
contends that it allows the jury to consider "nonstatutory aggravating circumstances."5 06 As noted previously, both of the trial
courts which have dealt with this issue, Harris and McIntosh,
found that this second step was an additional prophylactic
50 7
which safeguarded the defendant from the death penalty.
Since McIntosh resulted in a non-capital sentence being imposed 508 and Harris's sentence was invalidated in light of
Tomei, 50 9 the issue remains ripe for review.
The other issue that will present an interesting question
may be raised in Mateo, where the defendant has again raised
the "command" issue to determine whether it has a different
meaning now that "heightened due process" applies to the re510
view of his conviction.
The appellants in Cahill, Mateo and Shulman have again
called into question the constitutionality of Criminal Procedure
Law section 270.20(1)(f) providing for "death qualification" of
jurors as well as the propriety of various challenges to individual jurors in each case. 511 As discussed previously, the New
York Court of Appeals has determined in Harristhat this provision of the death penalty scheme is constitutional and is likely
to do so again. 51 2 The challenges involving the various jurors
and whether they affect the outcome of the case will, of course,
turn upon the unique facts of the voir dire of each juror.
Probably the most awaited determination by all who are interested in death penalty jurisprudence in New York is how the
New York Court of Appeals will determine whether capital pun505. See N.Y.

CRIM.

PRoc. LAw § 400.27(11)(a) (McKinney 2003) (emphasis

added); People v. Cahill, __ N.Y.2d -, 2003 N.Y. Slip. Op. 18881 (Nov. 25, 2003).
506. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 546, Point XXV, People v. Cahill, _
N.Y.2d -, 2003 N.Y. Slip. Op. 18881 (Nov. 25, 2003) (No. 123).
507. See People v. Harris, 676 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (Sup. Ct. 1998); People v.
McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798 (County Ct. 1998).
508. See People v. McIntosh, 682 N.Y.S.2d 791, 792 (County Ct. 1998).
509. See People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 728 (N.Y. 2002).
510. People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (County Ct. 1997).
511. See People v. Cahill, __ N.Y.2d _, 2003 N.Y. Slip. Op. 18881 (Nov. 25,
2003); Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 987; People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997, at
35, col. 5 (N.Y. County Ct. Sept. 26, 1997).
512. See Harris, 779 N.E.2d at 715.
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ishment violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the New York State Constitution. This issue has been raised in Cahill, Shulman, and
Mateo.513 For a multitude of reasons, it appears very unlikely
that the New York Court of Appeals will decide that the death
penalty scheme violates either the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution or article I, section 5 of the New
York State Constitution.
A review of the death penalty scheme enacted in 1995
reveals that it meets the requirements laid down by the United
5 1 4 It
States Supreme Court in Gregg, Woodson, and Roberts.
sets forth not only a sufficient class of clearly defined aggravating and mitigating factors for the jury to weigh, but also contains a catch-all provision which allows the jury to consider any
circumstance concerning the crime or the defendant's background which might mitigate the punishment. 51 5 The enactment sets a higher age threshold for a defendant to be death51 6
eligible and prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded.
The sentencing procedure not only requires the jury to weigh
and set forth its findings concerning the aggravating and mitigating factors, but also requires it to take a second step and
determine whether death should still be imposed. 51 7 As noted
previously, the appellate process requires the State's highest
court must not only review the facts as well as the law, but
must also conduct a proportionality review, which includes considering the race of the parties in arriving at a determination
whether the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to that
518
imposed in other cases.
In summary, the death penalty scheme in New York not
only comports with the Supreme Court's requirements, but exceeds them in some respects through the inclusion of additional
safeguards involving death eligibility, sentencing procedures
513. See generally Cahill, - N.Y.2d _, 2003 N.Y. Slip. Op. 18881; People v.
Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 30, 1998, at 35, col. 4 (N.Y. County Ct. Jan. 30, 1998);
Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
514. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
515. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(3), (9) (McKinney 2001).
516. Id. § 400.27(12)(b).
517. Id. § 400.27(11)(a).
518. Id. § 470.30(3)(b).
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and appellate review. While opponents of capital punishment
pin their hopes on a determination by the New York Court of
Appeals that the death penalty violates Article I, section 5 of
the State Constitution, both the long standing precedent and
recent holdings in its capital punishment decisions by the court
suggest that this is extremely unlikely. The court has been unyielding in its position that it is bound by the Supremacy Clause
in following the precedents of the Supreme Court. In 1973, in
Fitzpatrick, the court abolished capital punishment in New
York based upon the Supreme Court decision in Furman.5 1 9 In
1978, in Davis, it did so again, based upon the Supreme Court's
holding in Gregg, Woodson and Roberts.5 20 More recently, in
Tomei, it invalidated the plea provisions of the current legislative enactment based upon a Supreme Court holding that was
thirty years old, Jackson.5 1 In doing so, Judge Kaye wrote,
"Despite the passage of three decades, a plethora of decisions
involving the death penalty and a sea of change in plea bargaining, the Supreme Court has never overruled Jackson, which
522
binds this Court."
Unlike its decisions concerning Fourth Amendment and the
Sixth Amendment, the court has declined to find greater protection under the New York State Constitution than that afforded
by the Supreme Court holdings interpreting the Eighth Amendment. This fact was noted by Judge Marlow, in McIntosh, in
which he observed, "[w]hile New York can clearly afford greater
protection to a defendant than is required by Federal Law, it
5 23
cannot give less.
Notwithstanding the power of the court to expand the protection afforded by Article I, section 5 of the State Constitution,
to do so would require the court to take a 180 degree turn in its
longstanding approach to the Eighth Amendment and precedent, which seems, at best, unlikely.
Treatment of this issue by the trial courts which have considered it, including at least two currently pending before the
519. See People v. Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d 139, 145-46 (N.Y. 1973).
520. See People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456, 466-47 (N.Y. 1977).
521. See Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
522. Id. at 1203.
523. People v. McIntosh, 662 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (citations omitted); see also
People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988); People v. Samuels, 400 N.E.2d
1344 (N.Y. 1980).
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New York Court of Appeals, also offer little hope for those seeking its abolition under the State Constitution. Perhaps the
most in-depth, comprehensive analysis of the issue took place in
Hale, in which Justice Tomei undertook both an "interpretive"
and "non-interpretive" examination of the issue.5 24 In conducting his "interpretive" analysis, Justice Tomei compared Article I, section 5 of the State Constitution to the Eighth
Amendment to see if there were textual differences in which the
State Constitution recognized broader rights than the United
States Constitution. 525 In comparing the two, Justice Tomei
concluded:
Insofar as the cruel and unusual punishment clause is concerned,
it mirrors the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, "and in this form it first appears in the Constitution of this
state adopted in 1846." People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 119
N.Y. 569, 576, 24 N.E. 6 (1890). Because the relevant text of Article I, § 5 is the same as that of the eighth amendment, and arose
from the same historical context, interpretive analysis leads to
the conclusion that the text of Article I, § 5 provides no basis for
interpreting New York's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment 526any differently from that of the eighth
amendment.
Justice Tomei then went on to conduct a "non-interpretive"
analysis dismissing the claim, holding that it was an issue of
first impression, once again, citing People ex rel. Kemmler v.
Durston.5 27 He similarly rejected the argument that the death
penalty runs counter to this State's "contemporary values" by
engaging in a lengthy historical analysis in which he demonstrated that capital punishment was more prevalent throughout New York's history and would have been more so but for the
various vetos of two recent Governors. 528 He likewise rejected
arguments that capital punishment would result in "invidious
524. See People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 472 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
525. Id.
526. Id. at 472 (footnote omitted). In footnote 18 to this portion of his opinion,
the Justice observed, "[bloth constitutional provisions [were] borrowed from an English statute passed in the first year of the reign of William and Mary, entitled, 'An
act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of
the crown,' commonly known as the English Bill of Rights of 1689." Id. at 473 n. 18
(citations omitted).
527. People ex rel Kemmler v. Durson, 24 N.E. 6 (N.Y. 1890).
528. See Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
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racial discrimination" noting the various safeguards inherent in
529
the statute as well as the New York Court of Appeals review.
Ultimately he pointed out that it was for the legislature to determine whether capital punishment comported with the
State's contemporary standards of decency and concluded,
"There is nothing in the text of the New York Constitution or
the history and practices of this State that leads the court to
conclude that the punishment of death is so grossly disproportionate to the crimes enumerated in P.L. § 125.27 as to render
530
the statute unconstitutional."
Justice Tomei also dismissed what he termed the "fundamental right to life claim," Observing:
It is enough to say that there is no support in the federal or state
constitution, or any other Anglo-American law, for the claim that
the convicted perpetrator of a particularly atrocious murder enjoys an unqualified right to life, notwithstanding the legislature's
rational determination that the only appropriate sanction for the
defendant's egregious conduct is death.53 1
In Shulman,532 Judge Pitts, after reviewing Supreme Court
holdings, cited Hale5 33 and Chinn 34 in determining that section
400.27 of the Criminal Procedure Law withstood Eighth
Amendment scrutiny. The court then undertook a "non-interpretive" analysis similar to that done in Hale, ultimately concluding that:
No system can detect, in every case, all honest mistakes, incidents
of neglect, or outright acts of misconduct which may taint the process. New York's statute has nevertheless been drafted with
punctilious concern for individualized consideration and for the
rights of the accused. Accordingly, this branch of defendant's motion must be denied. 535
529. See id. at 474.
530. Id. at 476.
531. Id. at 476-77 (citations omitted).
532. People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997, at 36, col. 5 (N.Y. County
Ct. Sept. 26, 1997).
533. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
534. People v. Chinn, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1996, at 31, col. 3 (N.Y. County Ct.
Nov. 19, 1996).
535. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1997, at 36, col. 5.
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The court likewise found no constitutional authority or support
536
for an "Inalienable Right to Life" claim.
While Judge Bartlett in Arroyo537 declined to expressly rule
on this claim, he suggested that he would not have done so favorably, writing:
The State Constitution infers the constitutionality of capital
punishment in that the need for certain special procedures for
crimes punishable by death is referred to in several sections of
Article 1. In Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, the Appellate Division,
Second Department stated: "This Court has previously observed
that 'any inquiry into the existence of enhanced protection by the
State Constitution . . . [is better left] to the New York Court of
Appeals . . . as the State's policy-making tribunal.' " Therefore,
this Court declines to determine whether or not the "cruel and
unusual punishment" clause of Article I, § 5 prohibits what other
sections of Article I clearly accommodate, and provides constitutional protections greater than those required by the United
538
States Constitution.
Thus it would appear that history, precedent and the
weight of authority are such that it is highly unlikely that the
New York Court of Appeals will decide that the death penalty is
barred by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 5 of Article I of the New York State Constitution should it ultimately take up the question.
It is, of course, possible that none of the cases pending on
the court's docket will provide a vehicle for this determination.
The court, as it did in Harris,539 could find a flaw in each of the
trial court proceedings which requires it to invalidate the death
sentences pursuant to Hynes v. Tomei 540 or it could further find
another error in the penalty phase itself, thereby vitiating the
need to address the constitutionality of capital punishment until some future time. In either case, it appears likely that death
penalty jurisprudence in New York is an area ripe for further
evolution.

536.
537.
538.
539.
540.

Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
People v. Arroyo, 683 N.Y.S.2d 788 (County Ct. 1998).
Id. at 789.
See People v. Harris, 675 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 2001 (N.Y. 1998).
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